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INTRODUCTION

The past thirty years have witnessed a dramatic shift in
the debate over the taxation of gifts and bequests. In 1976,
when Congress unified the estate and gift taxes and added a
new tax on generation-skipping transfers, debate focused
primarily on the structure and operation of the transfer
taxes, but their role as an integral part of the federal tax
system was scarcely questioned. During the 1980s and 1990s,
however, the transfer taxes repeatedly came under attack,
culminating in recent attempts to eliminate the taxes
altogether. In 1999, and again in 2000, Congress approved
legislation that would eliminate the taxes over a ten-year
phase-out period.' Although neither bill survived a
presidential veto, controversy over the taxes clearly has not
subsided.
Opposition to the transfer taxes is remarkable both for its
growing political momentum and its extravagant rhetoric.
Some critics claim that the transfer taxes discourage work
effort, impede saving, and stifle capital formation.2 Others
blame the taxes for an alarming catalogue of social ills,
including unemployment, lack of equal opportunity for
minorities, and the demise of small businesses and family
farms.' These charges, while empirically unsubstantiated,

'

See Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 101 (2000) (proposing

repeal of transfer taxes effective in 2010); Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R.
2488, 106th Cong. § 601 (1999) (proposing repeal effective in 2009).
2
See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The End of the Estate Tax?, 76 TAX NOTES 105, 107 (1997);
William W. Beach, THE CASE FOR REPEALING THE ESTATE TAX 1-2 (The Heritage Found.
Backgrounder No. 1091, 1996); JOINT ECON. COMM., THE ECONOMICS OF THE ESTATE TAX
(Comm. Print 1998); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation,
104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); RICHARD E. WAGNER, FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXATION: A STUDY IN
SOCIAL COST (1993).
3
See Small Business Tax Fairness Act of 2000, H.R. 3832, 106th Cong. § 302 (2000)
(suggesting, in addition, that existing exemptions are ineffective due to an "inability to
legislatively duplicate the complex family relationships that exist in our society").

2001]

Death Without Taxes?

501

certainly reflect profound resentment of the taxes. To some
extent, frustration with the transfer taxes in their existing
form is understandable. Undoubtedly, they could be made
simpler, fairer, and less intrusive - the same could be said
of the income tax. But opponents of the transfer taxes clearly
contemplate repeal, not reform.
Several factors may account for growing opposition to the
transfer taxes. Inflation and real economic growth have
pushed an increasing number of estates above the taxable
threshold (currently $675,000).' Widespread use of the
unlimited marital deduction since 1981 has also increased
the number and size of taxable estates in the hands of
surviving spouses. Recent run-ups in stock market prices
have swollen the expectations of baby boomers who stand to
receive a massive intergenerational wealth transfer over the
next twenty years. Finally, projected budget surpluses which may or may not materialize - provide a rare window
of opportunity for cutting taxes on a grand scale.
Nevertheless, the level of popular enthusiasm for repeal,
rather than reform, of the transfer taxes remains something
of a puzzle. After all, these taxes produce relatively little
revenue;' they are paid by a select group of wealthy
taxpayers;6 and the average effective transfer tax rate is less

The exemption level is scheduled to rise to $1,000,000 in 2006. See I.R.C. § 2010(c).
As a percentage of all decedents, the number of taxable estates is expected to remain just
below two percent. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
6
In 1999, the transfer taxes raised around $28 billion, representing 1.5 percent of total
federal tax revenues. See Selected Historicaland OtherData, 19 S.O.I. Bull. 117,141 tbl.17
(Winter 1999-2000).
6 In 1997, the number of taxable estate tax returns filed was around 42,900, and the
total number of deaths was around 2,314,700. Thus, only around 1.85 percent of all
decedents incurred an estate tax liability. See PresentLaw and Backgroundon FederalTax
Provisions Relating to Retirement Savings Incentives, Health and Long-Term Care, and
Estate and Gift Taxes: HearingBefore House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 110
tbl. 17 (1999) (PresentLaw and Background).

502

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 20:499

than half of the stated top marginal rate of fifty-five percent.7
Perhaps, as Michael Graetz has suggested, the explanation
lies in an irrational optimism that leads a majority of
Americans to believe that they will rank among the
wealthiest one or two percent when they die.8
The purpose of this article is not to evaluate the merits of
the transfer taxes or to argue the case for repeal or reform.
That debate has been ably presented elsewhere.9 Instead, we
look at transfer tax repeal in terms of its repercussions on the
rest of the tax system. We assume, for the sake of argument,
that a decision has been taken to repeal the transfer taxes,
and we then explore the implications of that decision for the
income tax treatment of property transferred by gift or
bequest. Part II contends that transfer tax repeal would
reduce progressivity, exacerbate existing inequities with
respect to transfers of appreciated property, and sharpen the
need for income tax reform. Part III considers two possible
responses - a deathtime gains tax and a carryover basis
regime and discusses issues of structure and
implementation bearing on the choice between them. Part IV
extends the analysis to address the effect of taxing gifts and
bequests as income to the recipient. In conclusion, we suggest

7
See William G. Gale & Joel B. Slemrod, Rethinking the Estate and Gift Tax: Overview
35 & tbl.7 (July 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Va. Tax Rev.) (in 1997, average
effective transfer tax rate for all returns was 13 percent; average effective transfer tax rate
for taxable returns was 22 percent); Barry W. Johnson & Jacob M. Mikow, FederalEstate
Tax Returns, 1995-1997, 19 S.O.I. BULL. 69,83 (Summer 1999) (in 1997, for taxable returns,
average estate tax rate, as percentage of net worth less estate expenses and marital and
charitable bequests, was 23.2 percent).
'
See Michael J. Graetz, To Praisethe Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 285

(1983).
9 See John E. Donaldson, The Futureof Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuringand
Refinement, orReplacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 539 (1993), and sources cited therein;
see also the symposium forthcoming in 48 CLEvE. ST. L. REV. (2000); James R. Repetti,
Democracy, Taxes and Wealth (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Va. Tax Rev.).
For a moderate reform proposal, see William J. Turnier, ThreeEquitable Taxpayer-Friendly
Reforms of Estate and Gift Taxation, 87 TAx NOTES 269 (2000).
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that the transfer taxes cannot simply be eliminated without
risking potentially serious problems for the larger tax system.
II.

TRANSFER TAXES IN PERSPECTIVE

Formally, the transfer taxes operate separately from and
quite independently of the income tax. Functionally, however,
the transfer taxes interact with the income tax in ways that
may have significant implications both for the distribution of
tax burdens and for the timing and structure of gifts and
bequests.
A.

Progressivity

The transfer taxes are often credited with making a
significant contribution to the progressivity of the federal tax
system."0 Traditionally, the income tax has favored income
from capital by permitting deferral of unrealized gains and
taxing realized gains at relatively low effective rates. This
preferential income tax treatment benefits the wealthy
disproportionately, given the concentration of capital assets
in their hands" coupled with the tendency of the realized rate

10 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 91st Cong., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND
PROPOSALS 106 (Comm. Print 1969) (1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS) (estimating, based on
1965 data, that estate and gift taxes were "probably responsible for about one-third of the
net progressivity" of the federal tax system); Graetz, supra note 8, at 272 (estimating, based
on 1972 data, that "the estate and gift taxes contributed nearly one-third as much to the
progressivity of our tax structure as did progressive individual income tax rates"). See also
Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV.
1183, 1194 (1983).
" In 1992, the top one percent of families held 36 percent of total household marketable
wealth and 46 percent of total household financial wealth; for the top 20 percent, the
corresponding figures were 84 percent and 92 percent. See Edward N. Wolff, Who Are the
Rich? A DemographicProfile of High-Income and High-WealthAmericans, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 74, 77 (Joel B. Slemrod ed.,
2000). See also LEONARD E. BURMAN, THE LABYRINTH OF CAPITAL GAINS TAX POLICY 90
tbl.6-2 (1999) (showing distribution of asset holdings by income).
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of return on capital to decline as wealth increases. 12 Thus, the
estate tax backstops the income tax by reaching wealth
accumulated from tax-preferred sources. While in theory it
might be possible to achieve any desired degree of
progressivity by increasing income tax rates, high marginal
rates may have unacceptable efficiency costs. Deathtime
taxes are often considered to have lesser disincentive effects
than income taxes of equal yield because individuals are
decisions
likely to discount deathtime taxes in making
13
investment.
and
savings,
work,
concerning
There is a strong prima facie case for the progressivity of
these taxes, for they fall primarily on taxpayers in the top
tier of the wealth and income distributions. 4 Under current
law, households in the top one percent of the income
distribution bear sixty-four percent of the federal estate tax
burden, and those in the top five percent bear ninety-one
percent of the burden.' 5 The transfer tax burden is also highly

12

See Eugene Steuerle, Wealth, Realized Income, and the Measure of Well-Being, in

HORIzONTAL EQuITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 97-100 (Martin David &
Timothy Smeeding eds., 1985) (measuring gross capital income subject to tax as percentage
of wealth, based on 1976 data); David Joulfaian, THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX:
DESCRIPTION, PROFILE OF TAXPAYERS, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 30-31 & tbl.24 (U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, OTA Paper No. 80, 1998) (measuring non-wage adjusted gross
income as percentage of gross estate, based on 1981 and 1982 data, and noting that "the
realized rate of income for those with estates under $500,000 is about twice as large as that
of the wealthiest group").
13
See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 234-35(5th ed. 1987); Gale & Slemrod,
supra note 7, at 18.
14
See William G. Gale & Joel B. Slemrod, A Matter of Life and Death:Reassessing the
Estate and Gift Tax, 88 TAX NOTES 927,930 (2000) ("Most estimates suggest that the estate
tax is the single most progressive federal tax.").
15
See JULIE-ANNE CRONIN, U.S. TREASURY DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 24
tbl.12 (U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, OTA Paper No. 85, 1999). The following table
summarizes the proportionate shares of the federal estate and individual income tax
burdens borne by households in the top one percent, five percent, ten percent, and twenty
percent of the income distribution:
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skewed toward decedents at the top end of the wealth
distribution. 16 One recent study compares the estate tax
liability of wealthy decedents with their income tax liability
for the year before death, and concludes that "[tihe estate tax
significantly contributes to the overall tax burden on the
wealthy." 7 Alternatively, the transfer taxes can be recast as
an equivalent investor-level tax on capital income, with the
effective rate varying according to the taxpayer's age and
mortality risk. 8
The degree of progressivity in the federal tax structure
has fluctuated over the last two decades. After dramatically

Estate Tax

Individual Income Tax

Top 1 percent

64 percent

30 percent

Top 5 percent

91 percent

49 percent

Top 10 percent

96 percent

61 percent

Top 20 percent

99 percent

77 percent

See id. For households in the top one percent of the income distribution, the transfer tax
burden is more than six percent of the individual income tax burden. See id. (for top one
percent, transfer taxes represent 1.3 percent of household income, and the individual
income tax represents 20.2 percent of household income). The Treasury's method assumes
that the decedent bears the burden of transfer taxes. See id. at 32. As a practical matter,
however, the implications for progressivity would not be significantly different under an
assumption that the burden falls on the recipient, since "recipients of estates tend to have
very high income and wealth themselves." Gale & Slemrod, supra note 14, at 930.
A See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 35 & tbl.6. In 1997, estates of less than $5
million accounted for 94.5 percent of all taxable estate returns and 49 percent of total
transfer taxes paid, while estates of $5 million or more accounted for 5.5 percent of all
taxable estate returns and 51 percent of total transfer taxes paid. See id.
17
Joulfaian, supra note 12, at 31. This study, based on data from income and estate tax
returns from the early 1980s, notes that the ratio of estate to income tax liability was more
than seven to one for the wealthiest group of decedents but only around three to one for the
least wealthy group of decedents subject to the estate tax. See id. at 31 & tbl.25.
N" See James M. Poterba, The Estate Tax and After-Tax Investment Returns, in DOES
ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 329, 330 (Joel B.
Slemrod ed., 2000); id. at 335 ("Estate taxes are taxes on capital.").
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cutting the top income tax rates in 1981, Congress moved in
1986 to compress the rate structure and broaden the income
tax base.19 Although the progressivity of the income tax
declined during the early 1980s, subsequent developments

may have largely reversed this trend. Increases in the top
income tax rates in 1993 were followed in 1997 by the
reinstatement of a significant capital gains preference. °
Taking 1980 as a baseline, income tax changes during the
ensuing two decades may have produced little or no net
change in progressivity. 2' Furthermore, in assessing the
direction and magnitude of changes in progressivity, it is
important to take account of the growing importance of flatrate payroll taxes.22 A plausible argument can be made that
the combined system of income and payroll taxes was no less
progressive at the end of the 1990s than at the beginning of

I9

For an overview of recent income tax changes, see Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G.

Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easingthe Casefor ProgressiveTaxation,4 FLA. TAX REV.
1, 13-14, 26-30 (1998).
20 High-income taxpayers benefit disproportionately from reduced capital gains rates.
In 1993, taxpayers with incomes over $200,000 realized 61.9 percent of capital gains and
paid 62.4 percent of the capital gains tax, while taxpayers with incomes of $50,000 or less
realized 15.6 percent of the capital gains and paid 10.5 percent of the tax. See
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND
THE REALIZATION OF CAPITAL GAINS 31 (1997) (PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP); Burman,
supra note 11, at 117-18 (discussing methodological problems in measuring distribution of
tax benefits from 1997 reduction in capital gains rates).
21
See JOEL B. SLEMROD & JON BAKLIA, DOES GROWING INEQUALITY REDUCE TAX
PROGRESSIVITY? SHOULD IT? 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7576,
2000).
" See Richard Kasten et al., Trends in Federal Tax Progressivity, 1980-93, in TAX
PROGRESSIVITYAND INCOME INEQUALITY 20 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 1994) (noting that between
1980 and 1993 "the progressive income tax has declined as a fraction of income while
payroll taxes have grown"); see also Andrew Mitrusi & James Poterba, The Distributionof
Payrolland Income Tax Burdens,1979-1999,53 NAT'L TAXJ. 765,782 (2000) ("Nearly twothirds of families in 1999 paid more in payroll taxes than they did in federal income taxes.").
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the 1980s,2" and it is far from clear that there has been a
dramatic decline in the overall level of progressivity.
The transfer taxes have undergone similar fluctuations.
In 1981, just five years after the unification of the estate and
gift taxes and the introduction of the original generationskipping transfer tax, Congress slashed transfer tax rates
and raised exemptions, prompting one prominent
commentator to describe Congress' attitude as
"schizophrenic."24 The 1986 revision of the generationskipping transfer tax broadened the transfer tax base, and
subsequent years have brought further changes in rates and
exemptions as well as an eclectic array of special allowances
and anti-abuse provisions.25 The latest round of increases in
the unified credit, enacted in 1997, will gradually raise the
exemption equivalent from $600,000 in 1997 to $1,000,000 in
2006,26 leaving just under two percent of all decedents'
estates subject to estate tax.
While the progressivity of the federal tax system may
have changed only slightly since 1980, the distribution of

"
There is considerable controversy surrounding the allocation of social security taxes
and benefits within and across generations. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Comments, in TAX
PROGRESSIVITYAND INCOME INEQUALITY 51, 57 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 1994) (noting Eugene
Steuerle's observation that when social security taxes and benefits are considered together,
"the system looks as if it has become more progressive").
Graetz, supra note 8, at 263. For discussions of the impact of the 1981 legislation on
the progressivity-enhancing role of the transfer taxes, see id. at 262-63; Gutman, supra note
10, at 1195-97.
2
For an overview of recent transfer tax changes, see David Joulfaian, A Quarter
Century of Estate Tax Reforms, 53 Nat'l Tax J. 343 (2000).
" See I.R.C. § 2010(c) (as amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
§ 12, 111 Stat. 945, 954 (1997)). The 1997 Act also introduced indexing of the $10,000
annual exclusion and the GST exemption, beginning in 1999. See I.R.C. §§ 2503(bX2),
2631(c).
27
Recent projections show the number of taxable estates, as a percentage of all
decedents, fluctuating around two percent as the exemption rises over the next several
years. See PresentLaw and Background,supra note 6, at 115 tbl. 19. The number of taxable
estates fell from 2.19 percent of all decedents in 1982 to less than one percent in the late
1980s, then rose to 1.96 percent in 1999. See id. at 110 tbl.17, 111-112, 114, 115 tbl.19
(attributing recent rise to several factors, including fixed nominal exemption, inflationary
increases in asset values, real economic growth, and demographic trends).
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income and wealth appears to have become markedly more
skewed.28 On balance, it might appear that the tax system
has had surprisingly little impact on disparities in income
and wealth.29 Indeed, both the effectiveness and the
appropriateness of using the tax system as an instrument of
redistribution remain controversial. Evaluating the desired
degree of progressivity inevitably requires difficult value
judgments and tradeoffs. Nevertheless, in assessing the
fairness of tax burdens, it is impossible to ignore evidence of
inequality in the pre-tax distribution of income and wealth.3"
In the face of growing inequality, a strong case can be made
for reinforcing rather than weakening the progressivity of the
tax system.3 '
The contribution of the transfer taxes to progressivity is
necessarily constrained by the narrowness of the transfer tax
base. 32 Furthermore, these taxes may be perceived as unfair
or counterproductive because they are aimed at a small group
of wealthy taxpayers. The narrow focus of the transfer taxes
may nonetheless be justified on two grounds. A high
concentration of wealth suggests that the distributional
28
See Kasten et al., supranote 22, at 9,47-49; Joel B. Slemrod, The Economics of Taxing
the Rich, in DoEs ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 3,2021 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000); id. at 21 ("Clearly, the rich are getting richer, not only in
absolute terms but also compared to everyone else."); Wolff, supra note 11, at 75-79
(discussing rising inequality of wealth and income between 1983 and 1992). See also Lynn
A. Karoly, Trends in Income Inequality: The Impact of, and Implicationsfor, Tax Policy, in
TAX PROGRESSIVrrYAND INCOME INEQUALITY 95, 97 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 1994) (concluding
that "the rise in pre-tax income inequality dominates any increase in post-tax inequality").
2
See Karoly, supra note 28, at 97.
3
See Slemrod, supra note 28, at 20 ("The principal motivation for levying particularly
high rates of tax on the affluent - achieving a just sharing of the tax burden - cannot be
evaluated independently of the pattern of distribution of pre-tax income and wealth.").
31 See Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 21, at 2 (discussing optimal tax implications of

distributional inequality); McMahon & Abreu, supra note 19, at 10 ("In a winner-take-all
market, progressive taxation may be not only efficient, it may be nearly optimal....").
3
See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 20 ("Small programs typically have small
effects."); Donaldson, supra note 9, at 544; Cf Jane G. Gravelle & Steven Maguire, Estate
and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues, 88 TAX NOTES 551, 552 (2000) (noting that criticism of
transfer taxes on the ground that they are easily avoided by the wealthy "could support
reform of the tax as well as repeal").
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impact of cutting transfer taxes is quite different from that of
an across-the-board reduction in income or payroll tax rates.
Additionally, the top tier of extremely wealthy taxpayers may
have distinctive characteristics that are relevant in
determining how they should be taxed.33 This raises delicate
issues of line-drawing and may require adjustments in the
current taxable threshold and rate schedule. By comparison
with the prevailing income tax trend, the structure of
transfer tax rates may appear unduly rigid. Over the last two
decades, a burgeoning unified credit has eclipsed the
progression at the lower end of the unified rate schedule,
even as income tax rates have become markedly compressed.
If greater harmonization in rates is desirable, one approach
might be to index the unified credit and restore a more
gradual progression in the unified rate schedule.
Wherever the lines are drawn, neither the limited reach
of the existing transfer taxes nor their modest contribution to
progressivity furnishes grounds for their repeal. Indeed, the
evolution of tax policy over the last two decades suggests no
clear consensus on the optimal level of progressivity within
the overall tax system. The current income tax rate structure
is open to criticism for failing to address growing inequalities
of income and wealth.34 Even if a dramatic increase in the
progressivity of the income tax seems unlikely, it does not
follow that abolishing the transfer taxes represents an
appropriate response to growing inequality. Furthermore,
repeal of these taxes would have serious implications for the
income tax.

For example, issues of obvious interest are how responsive wealthy taxpayers are to
tax law changes generally and how readily they can arrange their affairs to minimize or
avoid taxes. See Karoly, supra note 28, at 126 (noting evidence suggesting that wealthy
taxpayers may be less responsive than formerly assumed); Martha Eller et al., The
Magnitude and Determinants of Federal Estate Tax Noncompliance (2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Va. Tax Rev.).
34
See McMahon & Abreu, supra note 19, at 73-80.
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The role of the transfer taxes as a backstop for the income
tax has been challenged on the ground that direct reform of
the income tax would be preferable. For example, the income
tax base could be broadened by taxing capital gains at death
and perhaps including gifts and bequests in the recipient's
gross income.35 These income tax reforms would reduce the
significance of the transfer taxes as a backstop for the income
tax.36 The existing transfer taxes might then be restructured
to serve the more limited traditional goals of curbing
excessive concentrations of inherited wealth and providing a
modest source of additional revenue. While proposals to tax
gains at death or include gifts and bequests in gross income
may be conceptually satisfying, Congress has shown no
inclination to move in this direction. Nevertheless, repeal of
the transfer taxes might highlight glaring inconsistencies in
the current income tax and thereby strengthen arguments for
such reforms.
B.

Deathtime Basis Step-Up

Under current law, property passing from a decedent
generally takes a basis in the recipient's hands equal to its
fair market value at the date of death (or alternate valuation
date, if applicable).37 Since death is not treated as a
realization event, any built-in gain or loss simply disappears.
The failure to tax unrealized appreciation at death has been
described as the "most serious defect" in the federal tax

See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell & C. Nicole Ernsberger, Wealth Transfer Taxation: The
Relative Role for Estate and Income Taxes, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 3, 4-5 (Nov./Dec. 1988).
Proposals for a deathtime gains tax and for including gifts and bequests in income are
discussed infra in Parts III and IV, respectively.
M Even if such reforms were adopted to "perfect" the income tax, however, some form
of tax on wealth transfers might nevertheless be defended "on both efficiency and
redistributive grounds." Gutman, supra note 10, at 1191 n.24.
37
See I.R.C. § 1014(a).
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structure.3 8 . While precise figures are not available,
economists estimate that up to fifty percent of all capital
gains permanently escape income tax as a result of the
deathtime basis step-up.39 Accordingly, the deathtime basis
step-up contributes significantly to reducing the effective tax
rate on capital gains.
The deathtime basis step-up creates considerable revenue
loss4" and is widely regarded as both inequitable and
inefficient. In 1969, the Treasury proposed an extensive
program for tax reform, including a proposal to tax
unrealized gains at death.4 ' The primary justification offered
for this proposal was that it would eliminate unwarranted
discrimination in favor of individuals who hold appreciated
assets at death compared to those who realize gains during
life and would thereby reduce the lock-in effect attributable
to the deathtime basis step-up.4 2 Under the proposed
deathtime gains tax, property held at death would be treated
as if it were sold for fair market value, thereby triggering
gain or loss on the decedent's final income tax return. To
38
Jerome Kurtz & Stanley S. Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969
Treasury Proposals,the Criticisms,and a Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1381 (1970).
See also Burman, supra note 11, at 19 (referring to failure to tax capital gains at death as
the "angel of death loophole").
39
See THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 221 (Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton
eds., 1984) (noting that "about half of gains are never realized because of the increase of
basis at death"); Burman, supra note 11, at 51.
40
The revenue loss attributable to the deathtime basis step-up is projected to rise from
around $28 billion in 2001 to around $33 billion in 2005; the total projected revenue loss for
the period 2001-2005 is around $153 billion. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2001, 109 tbl.5-1 (2000) (ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES).
41
See 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 331-51. These proposals, prepared
by the Treasury Department at the close of the Johnson administration, appeared in
February 1969 as a joint publication of the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee. For an earlier proposal along similar lines, see President's1963
Tax Message: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives,
88th Cong. 128-40 (1963) (President's1963 Tax Message).
42
For a thorough discussion of the 1969 Treasury proposals and a response to critics, see

Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 38, at 1381-89, 1396-1400. For a valuable discussion of
alternative approaches, see Michael J. Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death An Evaluation of the Current Proposals,59 VA. L. REV. 830 (1973).
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avoid double taxation, any resulting capital gains tax would
be allowed as a deduction for estate tax purposes.4 3 Since the
proposed tax would generally reach all built-in gain in
appreciated assets held at death, such assets would receive a
stepped-up basis in the hands of the recipient.44 The Treasury
proposal also provided parallel treatment for lifetime gifts by
taxing unrealized appreciation in property transferred by
gift.

45

In addition to a deathtime gains tax, the 1969 Treasury
proposals also included unification of the estate and gift taxes
and the introduction of a new tax on generation-skipping
transfers. 46 None of these proposals was enacted immediately,
though all of them remained under active consideration. In
1976, Congress followed through with a sweeping reform of
the transfer tax system, but failed to enact a deathtime gains
tax.47 Instead, as part of a compromise to achieve revenue
neutrality and garner support for the transfer tax reforms,
the 1976 legislation provided that property passing from a
decedent would generally take a carryover basis in the hands
of the recipient.'
Unfortunately, the carryover basis
provisions were added late in the legislative process, without
the usual opportunities for deliberation and technical

I Cf I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) (allowing estate tax deduction for claims against the estate,
including tax liabilities accrued during life).
" See 1969 TREASURYPROPOSALS, supranote 10, at 339 (proposing exceptions for certain
tangible personal property, charitable gifts and marital transfers).
See id. (explaining goal that tax on unrealized appreciation would "neither encourage
nor discourage lifetime transfers as opposed to death transfers"). The Treasury proposal
also provided for realization of losses on property transferred by gift, but such losses would
be nondeductible in the typical case of a transfer between related parties. See id.
See id. at 351-401.
47 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 2001-2010, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846
(1976) (unifying estate and gift taxes and adding tax on generation-skipping transfers).
48
See id., § 2005(a), 90 Stat. at 1872 (adding former section 1023). See Graetz, supra
note 8, at 261 (noting that "the enactment of the carryover basis was an explicit trade-off
for the support of the estate tax revisions," and that revenue losses from reduced transfer
tax rates, increased exemption, and certain other changes were to be offset by revenue
gains from carryover basis and tax on generation-skipping transfers).
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refinement,49 and they provoked widespread opposition from
organized interest groups. After extensive hearings, °
Congress postponed the effective date of the carryover basis
provisions in 1978 and ultimately repealed them retroactively
in 1980. 5'
Under current law, the benefit of the deathtime basis
step-up comes at a price. Although unrealized appreciation in
property passing from a decedent escapes the income tax net,
the full value of the property is includible in the decedent's
gross estate and potentially subject to estate tax.52 By holding
appreciated assets until death, it is possible to eliminate the
income tax on unrealized gains accrued during life;
alternatively, a lifetime sale of assets triggers a capital gains
tax but removes the amount of that tax from the estate tax
base at death. Thus, the deathtime basis step-up has an
undesirable "lock-in" effect since it encourages individuals to
hold appreciated assets until death and thereby artificially
distorts the choice between selling and retaining such assets

49
The carryover basis provisions were added in the conference report, based on a bill
that had previously been approved by the House Ways and Means Committee but not by
the full House or the Senate. See Graetz, supranote 8, at 261; Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections
on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEvE. ST. L. REv. 303, 319-22 (1976).
60 See Estate and Gift Tax ProblemsArising From the Tax Reform Act of 1976: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Tax'n and Debt Management Generally of the Comm. on Fin. U.S.
Senate, 95th Cong. (1977) (Estateand Gift Tax Problems); Estate and Gift Tax Carryover
Basis and Generation-SkippingTrust Provisionsand Deductibility of Foreign Convention
Expenses: HearingsBefore the Comm. on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives,
95th Cong. (1977) (Estateand Gift Tax CarryoverBasis); Technical CorrectionsAct of 1977:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Tax'n and Debt Management Generallyof the Comm. on
Fin. U.S. Senate, 95th Cong. (1977); CarryoverBasis Provisions:HearingBefore the Comm.
on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Cong. (1979) (CarryoverBasis
Provisions).
51 See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2763, 2884 (deferring
effective date of former section 1023); Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229, 299 (1980) (repealing former section 1023). One commentator
describes the "short unhappy life" of carryover basis as "one of the greatest legislative
fiascoes in the history of the income tax." Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46
VAND). L. REV. 361, 365 (1993).
52 In general, property must be includible in the gross estate to be eligible for the basis

step-up. See I.R.C. § 1014(b) (defining property acquired from (or passing from) the
decedent).
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during life. By reducing the incentive to hold assets until
death, the estate tax partially offsets this lock-in effect. Once
the potential estate tax liability is taken into account, the
rate differential facing a wealthy taxpayer in deciding
whether to sell or retain appreciated assets is closer to nine
percent than twenty percent.5 3 Simple repeal of the estate tax
would indirectly increase the tax price of realizing gains
during life and would thereby amplify the lock-in effect.5
The interplay between the income and estate taxes is
reflected in proposals linking repeal of the transfer taxes with
introduction of a deathtime gains tax or a carryover basis
regime. One reason for such linkage may be to offset at least
part of the projected revenue loss from eliminating the
transfer taxes. It is not clear, however, that the lost revenue
would be fully replaced by taxing capital gains at death.55 The
transfer tax rates are significantly higher than current
capital gains rates, and unrealized appreciation inherent in
assets held at death represents only a fraction of total wealth

If capital gains are taxed at 20 percent, the benefit of retaining an appreciated asset
until death is 20 percent of the deathtime basis step-up, but the amount of capital gains tax
saved may be subject to an estate tax of up to 55 percent. The rate difference can be
expressed as .20 x (1 .55), or nine percent. See Joulfaian, supra note 12, at 27. Thus, for
example, suppose a taxpayer holds appreciated property with a fair market value of $100
and a basis of zero. If the taxpayer sells the property for $100, pays a capital gains tax of
$20, and then incurs a 55 percent estate tax on the remaining proceeds, the total tax burden
amounts to $64 ($20 + ($80 x .55)). If the taxpayer holds the appreciated property until
death, thereby avoiding the capital gains tax, the total tax burden amounts to $55 ($100 x
.55).
See GERALD AUTEN & DAVID JOULFAIAN, BEQUEST TAXES AND CAPITAL GAINS
REALIZATIONS 17-18 (U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Feb. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Va. Tax Rev.); Joulfaian, supra note 12, at 28.
For example, current projections for 2005 show a tax expenditure of around $33 billion
due to the deathtime basis step-up, compared to total transfer tax revenues of nearly $37
billion. See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 40, at 47 tbl.3-1; id. at 109 tbl.5-1. A
deathtime gains tax might indirectly increase revenue by inducing lifetime realizations. See
Burman, supra note 11, at 138. As a practical matter, a deathtime gains tax is unlikely to
reach an amount approaching the total unrealized appreciation in assets acquired from a
decedent. See infra notes 119-120, 136-141 and accompanying text.
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transmitted at death.56 Depending on exemption levels, a
deathtime gains tax might raise revenue from a class of
decedents who are not subject to transfer taxes under current
law.
Revenue estimates prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) indicate that a deathtime gains tax would raise
$10.5 billion in 2002." 7 These estimates reflect an exemption
for gains on appreciated assets passing to a surviving spouse
(which would take a carryover basis in the spouse's hands),
as well as exemptions for gains on appreciated assets passing
to charity, $250,000 of gain on a personal residence, and
small gains on personal property.' As a result of these
exemptions, around ten percent of decedents would be subject
to the deathtime gains tax.59 Additional exemptions might be
adopted to limit the reach of the tax and allay political
opposition, with potentially dramatic revenue effects.6 ' A
large general exemption would concentrate the tax burden
among the wealthiest decedents, while a more modest

M See James

M. Poterba & Scott Weisbenner, The Distributional Burden of Taxing

Estates and Unrealized Capital Gains at the Time of Death 19 & 36 tbl.8 (June 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Va. Tax Rev.) (estimating that, based on 1998 Survey
of Consumer Finances, unrealized capital gains at death represented 36 percent of the total
expected value of all estates and 56 percent of the total expected value of estates of $10
million or more).
57
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 311 (2000) (BUDGET OPTIONS).
It is estimated that the deathtime capital gains tax would raise total revenue of $78.5 billon
for the period 2001-2010. See id.
M See id. Other estimates indicate that the revenue from a deathtime gains tax with
realistic exemptions might be considerably lower. See Poterba & Weisbenner, supra note
56, at 22 (estimating revenue of $4.5 billion in 1998, based on data from the 1998 Survey
of Consumer Finances). Revenue estimates may be quite sensitive to mortality
assumptions. See id. (noting that use of annuitant mortality table rather than population
mortality table reduced estimated flow of taxable gains by more than one-third).
59 See BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 57, at 311.
M See Poterba & Weisbenner, supra note 56, at 22 (assuming exemptions for gain on
appreciated assets passing to a surviving spouse and for $250,000 of gain on principal
residence, and noting that a $500,000 gain exemption would reduce estimated revenue yield
by nearly one-half, from $4.5 billion to $2.5 billion).
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exemption would shift the tax burden to middle-income
taxpayers who are currently exempt from the transfer taxes.61
In assessing distributional effects, it is important to
consider whether a deathtime gains tax is perceived as a
substitute for the existing transfer taxes or simply as a step
in the direction of a comprehensive income tax base.62 If the
deathtime gains tax is proposed as a replacement for the
transfer taxes, the inquiry can be framed in terms of whether
particular categories of decedents would experience a net
increase or decrease in their tax liability. From this
perspective, the deathtime gains tax may offer a substantial
windfall to wealthy decedents." If the deathtime gains tax is
instead perceived as "perfecting" the income tax, any
substantial exemption that would remove decedents of low or
moderate wealth from the reach of the tax would seriously
erode the tax base. In terms of a comprehensive income tax,
it is difficult to justify any exemption from a deathtime gains
64
tax.

61 With a $500,000 gain exemption (in addition to exemptions for marital bequests and
$250,000 of gain on a personal residence), decedents with a net worth of $10 million or more
would owe 51 percent of the deathtime gains tax; with a $100,000 exemption, those
decedents would owe only 35 percent of the tax. See id. at 22-23. Cf Zelenak, supranote 51,
at 374-75 (criticizing "regressivity" of deathtime gains tax with low exemption as
replacement for transfer taxes).
62 The distributional consequences of a proposed change may differ depending on
whether households are classified according to net worth or annual income. See Poterba &
Weisbenner, supra note 56, at 23-24 (using uniform imputed income measure to avoid
problem of different income-to-value ratios for various types of capital assets).
According to one estimate, a deathtime gains tax (with exemptions for marital
bequests and $250,000 of gain on a personal residence) would produce a lower tax liability
than the existing estate tax for 95 percent of decedents with net worth of more than $1
million. See id. at 25-26 (estimating average tax saving of $672,700 for decedents in this
category). Among decedents with net worth of $1 million or less who incur estate tax, the
burden of a deathtime gains tax would be roughly similar to that of the existing estate tax.
See id. at 25.
See Joseph M. Dodge, FurtherThoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at Death, 47
VAND L. REV. 1827, 1855-56 (1994) (arguing that exemption for small estates "makes a
mockery of the income tax" and "treats the deemed-realization proposal as if it were merely
an incremental estate tax").
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A carryover basis regime would raise far less revenue
than a deathtime gains tax because it would permit indefinite
deferral for beneficiaries who could afford to postpone selling
inherited assets. By one estimate, assuming a "deemed" basis
for assets acquired from a decedent equal to fifty percent of
their deathtime value, 65 a carryover basis regime would raise
revenue of $1.1 billion in 2002, increasing gradually to $4.3
billion in 2005.66 The revenue estimates for any carryover
basis regime are quite sensitive to the time horizon for
realization of gains, which in turn is extremely difficult to
67
predict.
The benefit of deferral under a carryover basis regime
may be viewed as equivalent to a reduction in the effective
rate of the capital gains tax.6 ' An effective capital gains tax
rate that varies according to the holding period might be
considered to have perverse distributional consequences,
especially since realization of gains may be postponed
indefinitely with respect to dynastic wealth. For
distributional purposes, it is important to bear in mind that
the composition of capital gain assets and the sources of
unrealized appreciation vary significantly within and across

" See Burman, supra note 11, at 139 (noting that deemed basis would avoid difficulties
in proving basis). Despite its apparent simplicity, the deemed basis approach would provide
a strong incentive to overstate deathtime value, especially in the absence of an estate tax,
and might invite other abuses as well.
6
See BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 57, at 312. It is estimated that a carryover basis
regime would raise a total of $47.8 billion during the period 2001-2010, or approximately
one-half of the revenue raised under a deathtime gains tax. See id.; supra note 57.
67 See Poterba & Weisbenner, suvra note 56, at 26 (reserving for future research the
issue of potential behavioral responses).
See PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 20, at 10-11 (noting that "the effective
tax rate on an asset that appreciates in value at 7 percent per year would be about one-half
the statutory rate of 28 percent if the asset was held for 30 years"). In a carryover basis
regime, taxpayers would have a strong incentive to engage in elaborate schemes to extract
cash from appreciated property without triggering a capital gains tax. See, e.g., Burman,
supra note 11, at 22 (describing "short-against-the-box" scheme).
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different income and wealth categories.69 To the extent that
the ratio of unrealized appreciation to value increases with
net worth, a deemed basis equal to fifty percent of deathtime
value would tend to confer disproportionate benefits on
wealthier decedents. °
C.

Lifetime Gifts

Under current law, lifetime gifts do not obtain the benefit
of a stepped-up basis but instead receive a carryover basis in
the recipient's hands. 1 For transfer tax purposes, lifetime
gifts are taxed at lower effective rates than bequests. The
rate differential arises because a donor's taxable gifts do not
include amounts used to pay the resulting gift tax; in
contrast, amounts used to pay the estate tax are included in
a decedent's taxable estate. 2 Some commentators attempt to
justify the lower gift tax rates as rough compensation for the
fact that lifetime gifts, unlike bequests, do not receive a taxfree basis step-up in the recipient's hands.7" The income tax
By one estimate, primary residences account for over 90 percent of unrealized capital
gains of households with net worth below $500,000, while active business assets account
for over 70 percent of the unrealized capital gains of households with net worth of $10
million or more. See Poterba & Weisbenner, supranote 56, at 20 & 36 tbl.8. Furthermore,
ownership of corporate stock, bonds, and business assets is concentrated among highincome households. See Burman, supra note 11, at 87-90.
10
See supra note 56 (noting that appreciation-to-value ratio rises with expected value
of estate); see also infra note 127.
71
See I.R.C. § 1015(a).
This longstanding disparity between the "tax-exclusive" gift tax base and the "taxinclusive" estate tax base persists despite the "unification" of the two taxes in 1976. The
lower effective rate for lifetime gifts cannot be justified on the ground that the tax is paid
earlier. See Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on
Transfer Tax Restructuring,41 TAXLAw. 653,657 (1988); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Timing
of Taxes, 39 NAT'LTAXJ. 499,503 (1986) ("The present value to a taxpayer of a consistently
defined tax will be the same whether the tax is deferred or accelerated, as long as the tax
rate remains constant and the base of a deferred tax increases over time by the rate of
return generally applicable to investment of proceeds available after payment of an
accelerated tax.").
73 See Paul B. Stephan III, A Comment on Transfer Tax Reform, 72 VA. L. REv. 1471,
1472 (1986) ("Preserving a rate differential between gifts and deathtime transfers is one
way of offsetting the income tax's discrimination between gifts and bequests.").
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disparity, however, does not furnish a persuasive reason for
a countervailing inconsistency in the transfer tax base.74 As
a proxy for a deathtime gains tax, the existing transfer taxes
are both "under-inclusive" due to the large exemption in the
form of the unified credit and "over-inclusive" because the
transfer tax base includes the full value of transferred
property regardless of appreciation.75
A preference for lifetime gifts is sometimes defended on
social, economic, or other policy grounds. For example, it has
been argued that a relatively low gift tax rate "causes
business and investment capital to be moved into the hands
of younger, more vigorous owners" and thereby encourages
risk-taking and innovation.7" The purported social or
economic benefits, however, are essentially speculative,
inadequately specified, and unsupported by empirical
evidence. 7 Even if a policy of encouraging lifetime gifts were
considered desirable, there is no reason to believe that the
existing system provides an efficient or effective subsidy for
such transfers.78 Given the rudimentary state of knowledge
concerning the motives for both gifts and bequests, the most
sensible approach may be one of tax neutrality between
lifetime and deathtime transfers.79

74
See Gutman, supra note 72, at 657 (noting that "the solution is a consistent income
tax rule rather than a compensating, base-eroding transfer tax preference").
'5
See Stephan, supra note 73, at 1484-85.

7

See American Bar Ass'n, Section of Tax'n, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring,41

TAX LAW. 393, 403 (1988); Stephan, supra note 73, at 1487-88; Ronald D. Aucutt, Further
Observationson Transfer Tax Restructuring:APractitioner'sPerspective, 42 TAXLAW. 343,
345-46 (1988) (noting "practical considerations" and "psychological factors").
'7 See Gutman, supra note 72, at 656; Gerald R. Jantscher, Death and Gift Taxation in
the United StatesAfter the Report of the Royal Commission, 22 NAT'LTAXJ. 121, 129 (1969).
78 See Jantscher, supra note 77, at 129-30 (noting that if wealthy individuals are likely
to make gifts regardless of tax savings, an efficient subsidy for lifetime gifts might be
structured to provide larger savings to less wealthy donors).
,9 A progressive rate structure would continue to provide an incentive for transferring
property sooner rather than later, since the subsequent appreciation in the property would
be removed from the tax base. See Gutman, supra note 72, at 655 n.13.
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The existing preference for lifetime gifts might be
expected to have a significant effect on the timing of
intergenerational transfers, especially if such transfers also
offer opportunities for income tax savings. Indeed, one study
concludes that the indirect effect of the transfer taxes on the
income tax may be quite large, partly as a result of incentives
that encourage lifetime giving to avoid the higher estate tax
rates.8 ° Wealthy individuals are assumed to make substantial
lifetime gifts to lower-bracket children and tax-exempt
charities, thereby reducing or eliminating the income tax on
income from the donated assets. 8 1 As a result of such taxavoidance behavior, the study concludes that historically the
revenue collected by the estate tax "may well have been near
zero, or even negative."82 This conclusion, while admittedly
Under the
speculative, seems inherently implausible.8
relatively compressed rate schedule of the existing income
tax, adult children of wealthy donors are unlikely to face
significantly lower marginal rates than their parents.
Moreover, since much capital income escapes taxation
See B. Douglas Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, in 1 TAX POLICY AND
THE ECONOMY 113,113-14, 135 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1987).
81 Rather than backstop the income tax, the transfer tax system may actually "generate
a rise in income tax avoidance activities sufficient to offset revenue collected through estate
levies." Id. at 115. Bernheim estimates that gifts may represent roughly one-third of total
transfers during life and at death. See id. at 126, 133. See also William G. Gale & John Karl
Scholz, IntergenerationalTransfersand the Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145,
147 (1994) (concluding that inter vivos transfers are about half as large as deathtime
transfers). Cf Joulfaian, supra note 12, at 21 (based on cumulative taxable gifts reported
by decedents in 1992, the share of wealth transferred during life was approximately 13
percent for the wealthiest decedents, equivalent to two percent of terminal wealth); see also
James Poterba, Estate and Gift Taxes and Incentives for Inter Vivos Giving in the United
States, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 237, 247 (2001) (in 1995, taxable gifts comprised 5.5 percent of
taxable estates).
82
Bernheim, supra note 80, at 115.
83
See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 25 (noting Bernheim's claim is "based on
speculative calculations and has not been corroborated by rigorous investigation"); see also
Joulfaian, supra note 12, at 29 (noting that "there is little evidence that estate and gift
taxes lead to an increase in gifts from parents with high income tax rates to children with
low income tax rates"). On the other hand, the surge in gift tax revenues following the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 suggests that wealthy taxpayers may be quite sensitive to expected tax
rate changes. See id. at 30.
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entirely or is taxed at rates significantly below the maximum
statutory rate, any revenue loss attributable to incomeshifting behavior is likely to be attenuated. Indeed, simple
repeal of the transfer taxes might well reduce overall revenue
by more than the forgone receipts from those taxes.8 4
By lowering the price of gifts and bequests relative to the
transferor's own consumption, repeal of the transfer taxes
might be expected to stimulate both lifetime and deathtime
transfers. Indeed, a deathtime gains tax would provide an
incentive for lifetime transfers of appreciated property if gifts
continued to receive carryover basis treatment and
accordingly offered opportunities for continued deferral. By
contrast, a gains tax applicable to gifts as well as bequests
would enhance tax neutrality between lifetime and deathtime
transfers.
D.

Maritaland CharitableTransfers

Repeal of the transfer taxes would also call into question
the treatment of transfers between spouses during life and at
death. Under current law, a transfer from one spouse to the
other is generally not subject to estate or gift tax due to the
unlimited marital deduction. 5 This treatment is grounded in
the view that a married couple comprises a single taxable
unit and that a shift of ownership within the unit does not
constitute a taxable event.8 6 In accordance with this view,
lifetime transfers between spouses are also disregarded for
income tax purposes: the donor recognizes no gain or loss,
84

See C. LOWELL HARRISS, GIFr TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1940) (noting

.protective" function of gift tax and suggesting that "[b]y checking avoidance of death and
income taxes, it may indirectly increase the revenues by a far greater amount than its own
direct yield"). Repeal of the estate tax with no change in the deathtime basis step-up would
reinforce existing incentives to hold appreciated property until death.
See I.R.C. §§ 2056 (estate tax), 2523 (gift tax).
See S. REP. No. 97-144 at 127 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 412, 461 (noting that
unlimited marital deduction treats spouses as "one economic unit for purposes of estate and
gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax purposes").
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and the recipient receives a carryover basis in the donated
property, thereby deferring any built-in gain." In the case of
a deathtime transfer of appreciated property to a surviving
spouse, however, the spouse receives a tax-free basis step-up,
and the unrealized gain accrued at the decedent's death
escapes income tax altogether. 8
Conceptually, allowing a stepped-up basis for marital
bequests is "fundamentally inconsistent" with the prevailing
view of spouses as a single taxable unit. 9 That view implies
that transfers between spouses at death should be
disregarded for income tax purposes and that a bequest to a
surviving spouse should receive carryover basis treatment,
just as in the case of a lifetime gift.9 ° As a political matter, it
would be virtually inconceivable to impose carryover basis
treatment on marital bequests as long as other bequests
generally qualified for a tax-free basis step-up. However,
repeal of the transfer taxes might pave the way for
reconsideration of the existing income tax treatment of
property acquired from a decedent. Under a deathtime gains
tax or a carryover basis regime, the question would arise

87 See I.R.C. § 1041.

= In the case of community property, the deathtime basis step-up applies not only to the
one-half interest passing from the decedent but also to the one-half interest already owned
by the surviving spouse. See I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6). This treatment is a relic from the period
between 1942 and 1948, when the full value of community property was generally subject
to estate tax at the death of the first spouse. The full basis step-up for community property
persisted even after the 1948 marital deduction put married couples in community property
states and common law states on a more even footing for tax purposes. See Stanley S.
Surrey, FederalTaxation ofthe Family - The Revenue Act of 1948,61 HARV. L. REV. 1097,
1117-21, 1138-40 (1948).
0 See Gutman, supranote 10, at 1239; see also Dodge, supra note 64, at 1853 (noting that
"spousal unity argument would seem to compel a carryover basis exception even under the
current stepped-up basis regime").
See Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and
Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1203 (1978) (arguing, in context of proposal to
include gifts and bequests in recipient's income, that "interspousal bequests would be
entirely tax-free, since the surviving spouse is the continuation of the original tax unit" and
that "all such tax-free gifts and bequests would entail a carryover basis to the transferee").
But cf Dodge, supra note 64, at 1853-54 ("husband and wife can be treated plausibly as a
single taxable unit only so long as both are alive").
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whether marital bequests, which account for a large portion
of deathtime transfers,9 ' should receive more favorable
treatment than bequests to other beneficiaries.
The treatment of charitable transfers raises issues
analogous to those concerning marital transfers. Under
current law, lifetime charitable transfers are "doubly
advantaged."92 The donor receives an income tax deduction
for the fair market value of the donated property - even
though the unrealized appreciation is not taxed - and the
property is removed from the donor's transfer tax base at no
cost due to the gift tax charitable deduction. 3 By contrast,
charitable bequests receive somewhat less favorable
treatment, since they are eligible for an estate tax deduction
but not for the general income tax deduction.9 4 Despite the
tax incentives for lifetime gifts, wealthy taxpayers manifest
a strong preference for charitable bequests.95 Given the
relatively minor economic significance of the transfer taxes,
scholarship in this area has focused primarily on the
relationship between income taxes and charitable giving.9 6 It
91
See Joulfaian, supranote 12, at 17 (reporting that surviving spouses received around
one-half of the "distributable estate" after payment of estate expenses, taxes and charitable
bequests, based on 1982 data).
N Eric Rakowski, Estate Tax Reform and CharitableGiving, 77 TAx NOTES 463, 466 n.9
(1997). If t and e are the marginal rates of income tax and estate tax, respectively, the price
of a lifetime charitable gift relative to a non-charitable bequest can be expressed as (1 t)
x (1
e). See David Joulfaian, Charitable Giving in Life and Death 4-5 (July 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Va. Tax Rev.).
See I.R.C. §§ 170 (income tax), 2522 (gift tax).
94
See I.R.C. § 2055; see also I.R.C. § 642(c) (income tax deduction for amount of gross
income paid to charity pursuant to the terms of a will or trust instrument, in lieu of
section 170 deduction). It is estimated that, in 1995, the estate tax charitable deduction cost
the federal government around $8.7 billion in forgone revenues. See Poterba, supra note 81,
at 11.
" See Joulfaian, supranote 92, at 1; Eugene Steuerle, CharitableGiving Patternsof the
Wealthy, in AMERICA'S WEALTHY AND THE Fu'rURE OF FOUNDATIONS 203, 215-18 (Teresa
Odendahl ed., 1987).
N The literature on income tax incentives is quite large. See, e.g., CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAx POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 32-34, 49-63 (1985)
(CLOTFELTER, CHARITABLE GIVING); Charles T. Clotfelter, The Economics of Giving, in
GIVING BETTER, GIVING SMARTER: WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATL COMM'N ON
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seems clear, however, that the estate tax plays a significant
role in influencing the overall level of charitable bequests.
While repeal of the transfer taxes would dampen
incentives for charitable giving both during life and at death,
the magnitude of the potential response is quite uncertain.98
The reduction in transfer taxes would raise the price of
charitable giving relative to alternative uses of the
transferor's accumulated wealth, including transfers to noncharitable beneficiaries.99 It is impossible to predict a priori
the extent to which this "price effect" would be offset by the
countervailing "wealth effect" due to the transferor's
increased wealth.' ° The net effect may be not only to depress
charitable giving overall but also to alter the allocation of
PHILANTHROPY AND CmC RENEWAL 31 (John W. Barry & Bruno V. Manno eds., 1997)
(Clotfelter, Economics ofGiuing).Recent studies of charitable giving also focus on estate tax
incentives. See, e.g., Gerald Auten & David Joulfaian, Charitable Contributions and
IntergenerationalTransfers, 59 J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1996); Auten & Joulfaian, supra note 54;
Michael J. Boskin, Estate Taxation and CharitableBequests, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 27 (1976);
CLOTFELTER, CHARITABLE GIvING, supra,at 233-40; David Joulfaian, CharitableBequests
and Estate Taxes, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 169 (1991); Joulfaian, supra note 92; Rakowski, supra
note 92.
While stimulating charitable giving by reducing the price of such transfers (the "price
effect"), the estate tax also reduces the transferor's terminal wealth (the "wealth effect"),
thereby depressing the incentive to give. See David Joulfaian, Estate Taxes and Charitable
Bequests by the Wealthy, 53 NAT'L TAXJ. 743,761 (2000) (concluding that the estate tax has
a "modest effect" on charitable giving); see also Rakowski, supra note 92, at 470-72
(discussing econometric studies of charitable bequests). A larger issue is whether the estate
tax charitable deduction "stimulates charitable giving by more than the revenue loss to the
government." Joulfaian, supra, at 761 (concluding that deduction for charitable bequests
.seems to be 'budget' efficient").
8
See Joulfaian, supra note 97, at 761 (estimating that, in the absence of estate tax,
charitable bequests may decline by about 12 percent); Clotfelter, Economicsof Giving, supra
note 96, at 46 (estimating decline of 24 to 44 percent); Rakowski, supra note 92, at 471
(giving range of estimates based on different assumptions concerning wealth and price
elasticity).
9
Under current law, a decedent in a 60 percent transfer tax bracket must accumulate
an estate of $2.50 for each $1.00 left to a child (after paying $1.50 in tax), while an
equivalent charitable bequest costs only $1.00. See Rakowski, supra note 92, at 471.
1W See supra note 97; Rakowski, supra note 92, at 471-72 (summarizing findings that
wealth elasticity is likely to be relatively small compared to price elasticity, but cautioning
that"'[the econometrically predicted declines in charitable bequests ... might be excessive").
See also ROGER S. SMITH, PERSONAL WEALTH TAXATION: CANADIAN TAX POLICY IN A
HISTORICAL AND AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING 82 (1993) (noting lack of "empirical evidence
on the net effect of these offsetting forces").
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charitable transfers among various categories of
organizations and purposes. If, as seems likely, the brunt of
the predicted decline in charitable giving is borne by
organizations whose benefactors tend to be most sensitive to
tax rate changes, higher education, medical research, arts,
and culture may be hit hardest.'O While the impact on
charitable organizations furnishes grounds for concern, the
debate over repeal of the transfer taxes is likely to turn
mainly on other issues.0 2

101

See Gerald E. Auten et al., Taxes and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy, in DOES

ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 392, 405 (Joel B.
Slemrod ed., 2000); Rakowski, supra note 92, at 472; see also Joulfaian, supra note 96, at
173-74 (evidence that gifts to some charities are more price sensitive than gifts to others).
By contrast, religious organizations are likely to be hurt least. See Clotfelter, Economics of
Giving, supra note 96, at 37-38.
'" See Rakowski, supra note 92, at 472-73.
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ANOTHER LOOK AT A DEATHTIME GAINS TAx AND
CARRYOVER BASIS

Repeal of the transfer taxes would create substantial
pressure to reform the income tax treatment of property
passing from a decedent. Leading reform proposals present
two basic approaches for consideration. One approach
imposes a gains tax on net appreciation in property owned at
death and allows a corresponding basis step-up to the
recipient." 3 The other approach provides for carryover basis
in the recipient's hands, thereby preserving built-in gains and
losses until the property is eventually sold or exchanged. As
a matter of policy, perhaps the strongest arguments in favor
of a deathtime gains tax are that it imposes meaningful
limits on deferral and ameliorates the problem of lock-in."
Realistically, the choice between a deathtime gains tax and
carryover basis is likely to turn on political and practical
considerations.
Repeal of the transfer taxes would remove one
longstanding obstacle to taxing gains at death, namely, the
popular perception that overlapping income and estate taxes

10

The character and amount of gains and losses realized at death, as well as the

applicable rates, could generally be determined in the same manner as those realized
during life. See 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 340-41. Relief from the
regular loss limitations, and perhaps special averaging provisions, might be desirable,
though they would add complexity. For the sake of simplicity, deathtime gains and losses
might instead be taxed at a single flat rate. See Graetz, supra note 42, at 852-53. A further
issue under a deathtime gains tax is whether"income in respect of a decedent" (IRD) should
be taxed on the decedent's final income tax return or (as under current law) in the hands
of the recipient. CompareGraetz, supranote 42, at 853 (recommending retention of existing
treatment) with 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supranote 10, at 347-48 (recommending tax
at death); cf. President's 1963 Tax Message, supra note 41, at 137-38 (recommending
existing treatment for ordinary income items, tax at death for other items).
104 Proponents also argue that a deathtime gains tax "enforces the principle that income
should be taxed to the person who earned it" and operates "at an ideal time in terms of
ability to pay (because the decedent has no use for the amount due as taxes, and whatever
the heirs or beneficiaries receive is a windfall)." Zelenak, supra note 51, at 367. See also
Dodge, supra note 64, at 1838-44. But cf Robert B. Smith, Burying the Estate Tax Without
ResurrectingIts Problems,55 TAxNOTEs 1799, 1800 (1992) (recommending carryover basis
rather than deathtime gains tax).
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imposed at death constitute inappropriate "double
taxation."' °5 Although this slogan reflects a fundamental
misapprehension of the goals of the respective taxes and their
relationship to each other, 1 6 it has considerable rhetorical
force and may explain why in 1976, against the backdrop of
the newly unified transfer taxes, Congress opted for carryover
basis rather than a deathtime gains tax to deal with the
problem of unrealized appreciation.
Interestingly, however, recent proposals have advanced
carryover basis not as a complement to the transfer taxes but
as a replacement for them. 1 7 These proposals contain a bare
sketch of a carryover basis regime to be implemented
prospectively following a ten-year phase-out of the transfer
taxes.'
It is difficult to imagine that the latter-day
proponents of carryover basis have forgotten the experience
with the 1976 legislation. Indeed, the studied casualness with
which they leave implementation to future Treasury
regulations suggests that their primary goal may be to
abolish the transfer taxes, not to provide a workable
carryover basis regime."°9 Moreover, the potential problems
with carryover basis have attracted remarkably little
comment from the organized interest groups that complained

101 See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAx 127 (2d ed. 1995) ("Gifts
represent a transfer of income that has already been taxed, and there is no reason to tax
it again."). Cf. Richard M. Bird, Canada'sVanishing Death Taxes, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
133, 137-38 (1978) (discussing the political tradeoffbetween enactment ofa deathtime gains
tax and repeal of transfer taxes in Canada).
10 See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 364.
107

See, e.g., H.R. 8, supra note 1; H.R. 2488, supra note 1. See also Krisanne M.

Schlachter, Repeal ofthe FederalEstate and Gift Tax: Will It Happen and How Will It Affect
Our ProgressiveTax System?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 781 (2000) (recommending repeal of estate
tax coupled with enactment of carryover basis).
1
See H.R. 8, supra note 1, § 103 (proposed section 1022).
'"
See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 27 ("[Ilt seems likely that what the House really
passed was an abolition of the estate tax."). The relatively small revenue impact of
carryover basis proposals may raise further doubts about their long-term viability. See
BUDGET OPTIONS, supranote 57, at 312 (estimating $10.5 billion revenue for first five years
of carryover basis and $47.8 billion revenue for first ten years).
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so strenuously about the 1976 legislation. If the carryover
basis proposals are to be taken seriously, these problems
deserve closer examination."0
A.

Exemptions

A focal point of opposition to the 1976 carryover basis
legislation was the problem of determining the basis of
property owned at death. Organizations representing
lawyers, bankers, accountants and other interest groups
argued that establishing the decedent's basis in particular
assets imposed unreasonable burdens, especially in the case
of small estates that were exempt from other tax reporting
requirements."' In their eagerness to portray carryover basis
as unworkable, however, the critics may have overstated the
scope of the problem." 2 Taxpayers can reasonably be expected
to maintain adequate basis records, either because they may
decide to sell the assets during life or because they will be

110

An important lesson from the 1976 legislation is that successful implementation of

carryover basis will depend on active cooperation from the tax bar and other interest
groups. See Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 TAX
L. REV. 411, 438-92 (1982) (discussing role of the American Bar Association and other
interest groups in the demise of carryover basis).
.. Difficulties in proving basis were attributed to several causes, including the failure
of many taxpayers to keep meticulous records during life; the difficulty of reconstructing
basis after death; and the inherent complexity of basis calculations for farms, closely held
stock, and improved real estate. See CarryoverBasis Provisions,supra note 50, at 43,47-48,
79-101 (statement of American Bankers Association); id. at 111, 113-14 (statement of
American College of Probate Counsel); id. at 162, 168-69, 173 (statement of American Bar
Association). For a general discussion, see Zelenak, supra note 51, at 388-94.
112 See Carryover Basis Provisions, supra note 50, at 178, 180-85 (statement of Paul R.
McDaniel, discussing workability of carryover basis and concluding that "the availability
of adequate cost basis records is not a widespread problem"); id. at 9, 12-14 (statement of
Donald C. Lubick, describing the problem of proving basis as "a red herring"); James B.
Lewis, Taxing Unrealized Gains: The Nettle and the Flower, 4 REV. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 3,
20 (1980); JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 96TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES RELATING TO
CARRYOVER BASIS 21 (Comm. Print 1979) (BACKGROUND AND ISSUES). Commenting on the
implementation of the 1971 Canadian deathtime gains tax, observers found no "special
difficulties" in determining basis. R.M. BIRD & M.W. BUCOVETsKY, CANADIAN TAX REFORM
AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 51 (Canadian Tax Paper No. 58, 1976).
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aware of the need to prove basis in assets held at death."'
Even without such records, it is often possible to reconstruct
basis from other sources."'1 Proof of basis should not pose a
significant problem in the case of publicly traded stock, which
represents the single largest asset category in large estates." 5
As a practical matter, it may not be worth the trouble to keep
basis records for some assets;" 6 in other cases, the actual
basis may be so low that a presumption of zero basis is
warranted." 7
In some cases, proof of basis undoubtedly presents real
problems. The obvious response, under a deathtime gains tax
as well as a carryover basis regime, is to provide some sort of
exemption. Any exemption, of course, is conceptually at odds
with the notion of a comprehensive income tax base, and a
purist might insist on identical treatment for gains realized
8
during life as for those realized at or after death."
Furthermore, any exemption tends to perpetuate the problem
of lock-in. Nevertheless, as a matter of political expediency
and administrative convenience, a general exemption may be
necessary to ameliorate the problems of proving basis. In the
past, most proposals have recommended a general exemption
for small and moderate estates, typically at a level

"
Transitional relief in the form of a "fresh start" basis for assets acquired before the
enactment date is discussed infra at notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
114
Relevant sources include land records and mortgage lenders, in the case of real

property; tax returns and corporate books, in the case of closely held businesses; brokers
and other intermediaries, in the case of financial assets; and insurance records, in the case
of jewelry and collectibles. See CarryoverBasis Provisions,supra note 50, at 178, 181-82
(statement of Paul R. McDaniel, discussing specific types of assets and taxpayers); id. at 9,
12-14 (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
15 See Johnson & Mikow, supra note 7, at 103 tbl.1c (publicly traded stock represented
39 percent of the value of estates of $5 million or more shown on returns filed in 1997).
"' For example, basis is irrelevant for personal or household effects that have no
appreciation and generate no deductible losses.
117 See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 393 (noting "trivial" tax consequences of inability to
prove $50 basis in a "highly appreciated painting").
.. The issue of whether an exemption for deathtime transfers should be extended on the
same terms to lifetime transfers is discussed infra at notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
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corresponding to the existing transfer tax exemption." 9 Even
after repeal of the transfer taxes, it seems likely that the
taxable threshold under a deathtime gains tax or a carryover
basis regime would be set sufficiently high to ensure that
prior law would be
estates that escaped transfer taxes under
20
1
well.
as
regime
new
the
under
exempt
A general exemption for property passing at death could
be measured in terms of basis, net appreciation, or fair
market value.' The most promising approach appears to be
a "minimum basis" allowance for the decedent's property: If
the decedent's actual basis is less than a specified amount,
the difference is allowed as a tax-free basis step-up, bringing
the aggregate basis up to the specified amount (but not
exceeding fair market value).'2 2 The adjustment is then
allocated to appreciated assets, reducing the amount of gain
ultimately subject to tax. 123 A minimum basis allowance is
self-adjusting in the sense that its benefit vanishes if the
decedent's actual basis equals or exceeds the specified
amount. Moreover, the fair-market-value limitation ensures
that the exemption cannot be used to generate artificial
losses.
Compared to a minimum basis allowance, an exemption
based on net appreciation or fair market value has significant

"9 The

deathtime gains tax proposed by the Treasury in 1969 provided a $60,000

exemption (corresponding to the then existing estate tax exemption), which would have
exempted 90-95 percent of decedents. See Graetz, supra note 42, at 842. A proposed
amendment to the 1976 carryover basis legislation would have raised the exemption from
$60,000 to $175,625 (matching the scheduled increase in the estate tax exemption), leaving
only 1.7 percent of estates subject to carryover basis. See Surrey, supra note 49, at 322. See
also Zelenak, supra note 51, at 414-16 (proposing deathtime gains tax with $600,000
exemption, explicitly linked to then existing estate tax exemption).
I See H.R. 8, supra note 1, § 103 (proposed section 1022(b)(2)(B), allowing $1,300,000
general exemption).
1
See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 416-20 (discussing alternative forms of exemption).
This is the basic approach adopted in the 1976 carryover basis legislation. See former
I.R.C. § 1023(d)(1).
123 No basis adjustment is allowed for assets with built-in losses, even if the aggregate
basis of the decedent's assets is below the specified amount. Cf former I.R.C. § 1023(dX1).
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shortcomings. Simply excluding a fixed amount of gain12 '
1 25
would confer an unwarranted benefit on large estates.
Similarly, an exemption for property up to a specified gross
fair market value, without regard to the decedent's actual
basis or the size of the estate, 2 ' would effectively screen out
"small" estates (i.e., those below the threshold amount) while
conferring substantial benefits on large estates. 127 The
exemption could be limited to estates with a total fair market
value below the threshold amount, but this would create an
undesirable "cliff effect": All appreciated property in an estate
just below the threshold would receive a full basis step-up,
while all appreciation in an estate just above the threshold
would be exposed to an immediate or deferred gains tax. 2 '
Allocating a general exemption to particular assets poses
fewer problems under a deathtime gains tax than in a
carryover basis regime. To the extent that appreciation is
realized at death and taxed immediately, it makes little
difference how the exemption is allocated among capital
Cf President's1963 Tax Message, supra note 41, at 132 (proposing exemption for up
to $15,000 of gain on gift or bequest of appreciated property).
"'
See Graetz, supra note 42, at 842-43; Zelenak, supra note 51, at 416-20. Even if
reformulated as a vanishing exemption (i.e., one that disappears if total gain exceeds a
specified amount), a gain exclusion lacks the versatility of a minimum basis allowance
which functions equally well whether gain is realized immediately (as under a deathtime
gains tax) or deferred (as in a carryover basis regime).

I To avoid allowing an unlimited basis-step-up for debt-financed assets, such an
exclusion should be based on the gross value of the decedent's assets (i.e., including debt).
See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 420. H.R. 8, however, provided an exemption for property
with an "adjusted fair market value" (i.e., net of secured indebtedness) of $1,300,000. See
H.R. 8, supra note 1, § 103 (proposed section 1022(bX2)(B)). This would apparently permit
a taxpayer to finance lifetime consumption with secured indebtedness and then obtain a
basis step-up at death. See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 416-20.
1 The ratio of appreciation to value in property other than personal residences appears
to be highest for the wealthiest category of decedents, i.e., estates worth $10 million or
more. See supra notes 56 & 69. If personal residences are eligible for a separate exemption,
see infra note 139 and accompanying text, this suggests that the largest estates might reap
disproportionate benefits from an exemption based on a fixed amount of appreciation or fair
market value.
1" See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 416-17 (describing cliff effect as "grossly unfair"); id.
at 421 (pointing out similar cliff effect if losses allowed for estates above threshold but not
for those below threshold).
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assets. 129 By contrast, carryover basis offers virtually
unlimited flexibility in the timing and selection of assets for
realizing gains after death. The tax advantages of deferral
will be artificially enhanced to the extent the exemption is
130
allocated to assets that are to be sold soon after death.
While limited discretionary allocations might make sense as
a relief measure if assets have to be sold to pay a deathtime
gains tax, 13 ' there is no reason to allow the32exemption to be
manipulated simply to maximize deferral.'
The most obvious response is to require that any basis
adjustment be allocated among appreciated assets strictly in
proportion to their built-in gain, as was done in the 1976
legislation. 3 3 The difficulty with this approach is that the

Presumably, the exemption would be allocated first (and perhaps exclusively) to
appreciated capital assets, up to fair market value, and only thereafter (if at all) to ordinary
income assets. See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 422. Allocation problems may arise if any
remaining exemption is available for assets passing to a surviving spouse, see infra note 151
and accompanying text, or for ordinary income assets. If the existing treatment of IRD
remains unchanged, see supranote 103, such items would presumably be ineligible for any
basis adjustment. Such treatment might appear particularly harsh in the case of qualified
pension assets - the single largest category of IRD - if portfolio appreciation is
attributable mainly to capital assets. See generally John B. Shoven & David A. Wise, The
Taxation of Pensions:A Shelter Can Become a Trap, in FRONTIERS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
AGING 173 (David A. Wise ed., 1998).
130
H.R. 8 would have allowed the executor discretion to allocate the exemption,
apparently without restriction. See H.R. 8, supra note 1, § 103 (proposed section 1022(b)(4)).
In the absence of a fair-market-value ceiling, the exemption might even be used to generate
artificial losses.
131 A similar liquidity problem arose under the 1976 legislation. A sale of appreciated
assets to pay the estate tax could trigger a capital gains tax, in turn making it necessary
to sell additional assets. See BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, supra note 112, at 19 (describing
"mushrooming" tax problem). In response, one commentator suggested allowing the
executor to apply certain basis adjustments to reduce the gain on assets sold to pay the
estate tax. See Estate and Gift Tax CarryoverBasis, supra note 50, at 144, 145 (statement
of Edwin S. Cohen).
"I Furthermore, unlimited discretion would put the executor in the position of balancing
potentially conflicting duties to minimize the overall tax burden without favoring any one
beneficiary over another. The calculations necessary to determine the optimal allocation
would be quite complicated, and even a diligent executor acting in good faith would have
cause for concern about liability to disgruntled beneficiaries.
M See former I.R.C. § 1023 (requiring that aggregate basis adjustment be allocated to
appreciated assets based on the ratio of each asset's net appreciation to net appreciation of
all such assets); see also supra note 129 (discussing priority of allocation to appreciated
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amount of exemption allocated to each asset depends on the
basis and value of every other appreciated asset, which may
be unascertainable as long as the built-in gain in any asset
remains unrealized.'34 As a result, executors may be unable
to determine the basis of appreciated assets or the amount of
gain realized on their disposition during estate
administration, and recipients of in-kind distributions may be
faced with similar uncertainty for a potentially indefinite
period of time.135
In addition to a general exemption, further exemptions
may be proposed for specific categories of assets. The most
defensible categorical exemption is for items of non-business
tangible personal property having de minimis value (e.g., not
exceeding $5,000).136 The rationale for such an exemption is
simply that the administrative burden of ascertaining the
basis of such property outweighs any conceivable benefit, and
that any attempt to enforce a basis reporting requirement for
such property would be futile.3 7 The per-item value limit is
intended to ensure that the exemption cannot be used to
shelter items of substantial value (e.g., jewelry, art works,
and collectibles).3 8 Other categorical exemptions might be

capital assets).
14 The same would be true if the aggregate basis of all assets (including any minimum
basis allowance) were automatically reallocated to produce a uniform basis-to-value ratio
for all of the decedent's assets. Cf 1969 TREASuRy PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 34445
(proposing mandatory reallocation).
11 Whatever allocation method is chosen, it would presumably be necessary to provide
procedures for auditing and final determination of basis as well as value.
1"
Cf former I.R.C. § 1023(b)(3) ($10,000 exclusion for personal and household effects);
1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 342-43 (proposing exemption for $1,000 per
item of "ordinary personal and household effects"); Canadian Income Tax Act § 46 (deemed
minimum basis and amount realized of $1,000 on disposition of "personal-use property"
during life or at death).
137 See Graetz, supra note 42, at 843-44; Zelenak, supra note 51, at 424-27.
Such an exemption inevitably raises defimitional problems, especially in the case of
a set or collection of items. See Estate and Gift Tax Problems, supra note 50, at 147-49
(statement of Erwin N. Griswold, complaining of difficulty of determining basis in stamp
collection); see generally Zelenak, supra note 51, at 425-28.
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allowed for property such as personal residences,'39 farms,
and closely held businesses. 140 Although some sort of liquidity
relief (e.g., provisions for deferred payment) may be
appropriate for such property, allowing an exemption in the
form of a tax-free basis step-up can be explained only in
terms of political expediency.'
In one respect, repeal of the transfer taxes might simplify
the implementation of carryover basis. One major complaint
about the 1976 legislation focused on a pair of cumbersome
basis adjustments in connection with appreciated property
that was subject to federal or state death taxes., 2 These

13 Exempting gain on a deathtime transfer of a personal residence might be rationalized
as an extension of the existing $250,000 gain exclusion for lifetime dispositions under
section 121. The substitution of a gain exclusion for the rollover provision of prior law was
intended both to alleviate recordkeeping burdens and to remove barriers to sales by
homeowners who did not wish to purchase "larger and more expensive houses." See H.R.
Rep. No. 105-148, at 347 (1997). Although the latter purpose does not apply to post-death
sales, it could be argued that a parallel deathtime exemption would be necessary to avoid
creating an undesirable incentive for deathbed sales. Cf President's1963 Tax Message,
supra note 41, at 132 (proposing exemption for gain on deathtime transfer of personal
residence); Canadian Income Tax Act § 40(2)(b), (6) (limited exemption for gain on
disposition of principal residence).
1
Cf I.R.C. §§ 2032A (special valuation for real property used in farm or closely held
business), 2057 (deduction for qualified family owned business interests); Canadian Income
Tax Act § 110.6(2), (2.1) (capital gain exemption for disposition of qualified farm property
or qualified small business corporation shares).
1
See Gutman, supra note 10, at 1259-69 (discussing and criticizing existing liquidity
relief provisions); Dodge, supra note 64, at 1859 (suggesting carryover basis exception to
deathtime gains tax for "hard to value nonliquid interests in closely held businesses and
farms"). See also BIRD & BUCOVETSKY, supranote 112, at 49 (suggesting that "the difficulty
in devising politically satisfactory solutions to the liquidity problem in large part reflects
the fact that the problems are not really those of liquidity at all but rather are of a more
deep-seated psychological nature"); Douglas G. Hartle, Some Analytical, Political and
Normative Lessons from Carter,in THE QUEST FOR TAX REFORM: THE ROYAL COMMISSION
ON TAXATION TWENTYYEARS LATER 397,419 (W. Neil Brooks ed., 1988) (suggesting that the
real reason for most sales of family businesses was "the founder's lack of faith in the
business acumen of his family" and that the liquidity problem was invented as a
"convenient excuse" for sales that would have occurred in any event).
14
See former I.R.C. § 1023(c), (e). The main problem with these adjustments was that
the amount of the adjustments depended on the aggregate value of property subject to tax,
which often could not be ascertained until the marital share was fully funded. In addition,
liquidity problems prompted one commentator to suggest that the executor be allowed to
allocate the adjustments to reduce the gain on assets sold to pay the estate tax. See supra
note 131.
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adjustments were intended to achieve more neutral tax
treatment where gain was realized after death rather than
during life.143 In the absence of federal transfer taxes, such
adjustments would be needed only if the continuing burden
of state death taxes were thought sufficient to justify the
additional complexity.1" Repeal of the federal transfer taxes
might well encourage the states to slash their remaining
death taxes in a "race to the bottom" to attract wealthy
residents. 4 '
B.

Marital and CharitableBequests

Any regime that provides differential treatment for
bequests to a surviving spouse or charitable organization
involves added complexity. As a threshold matter, it is
necessary to identify which recipients and forms of
disposition qualify for special treatment. In the case of
marital bequests, the existing estate tax marital deduction
provisions illustrate the difficulty of defining the requisite
level of beneficial enjoyment and control, short of absolute
ownership, that constitutes deemed ownership by a surviving
spouse.1" Although those provisions could be borrowed as a
starting point for an analogous provision under a deathtime

143

In

the case of carryover basis property with unrealized appreciation, the basis

adjustments were intended to compensate for the lack of a reduction in the estate tax that
would have arisen from the payment of a gains tax had the property been sold before death.
See Graetz, supra note 42, at 834 n.14. Cf I.R.C. § 1015(d) (providing similar basis
adjustment for property acquired by gift).
1" Failure to provide a basis adjustment would encourage states to repeal their own
death taxes and create a barrier to any subsequent attempt to reintroduce death taxes at
the federal or state level. Cf PETER W. HOGG ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CANADIAN INCOME TAX
LAW 152 (3d ed. 1999) (noting abolition of death and gift taxes in all Canadian provinces
following 1971 repeal of federal transfer taxes).
" Presumably, the existing section 2011 credit for state death taxes would disappear
along with the federal estate tax, thereby eliminating in a single stroke the "sponge" or
"pick-up" taxes currently imposed by most states. See Joulfaian, supranote 12, at 30 (noting
that section 2011 credit dampens interstate competition for wealthy decedents).
1 See I.R.C. § 2056(b) (setting forth terminable interest rule and exceptions).
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gains tax or a carryover basis regime, repeal of the transfer
taxes would offer an opportunity to start with a clean slate.
Any definition of qualifying marital transfers would
undoubtedly raise concerns about incentives affecting the
allocation of ownership and control of property between

spouses. 147
The complexity of special treatment for marital bequests
could be avoided simply by subjecting them to the same
treatment as other bequests. Under a deathtime gains tax,
this would mean taxing built-in gain in assets passing to the
surviving spouse without regard to the concept of the married
couple as a single taxable unit. 4 ' Alternatively, in a
carryover basis regime, all assets could receive the same
carryover basis treatment without regard to the identity of
the recipient. It seems unlikely, however, that Congress
would resist political pressure to afford preferential
149
treatment to marital bequests, under a deathtime gains tax
or a carryover basis regime,' 50 to compensate for the loss of
the marital deduction under the existing estate tax.
The complexity is especially acute under a deathtime
gains tax that provides carryover basis treatment for marital
bequests. Such a regime requires a detailed mechanism to
identify and coordinate at least three different tiers of assets
14'

For a sampling of these concerns in the transfer tax context, see Wendy C. Gerzog,

The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995); Lawrence Zelenak, Taking CriticalTax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 1521, 1542-49 (1998); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Illogical and Sexist QTIP Provisions:
I Just Can't Say It Ain't So, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (1998).
'
See supra note 86 and accompanying text; Graetz, supra note 42, at 844-45
(recommending this approach on grounds of simplicity).
49
See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 396 (suggesting that politically viable deathtime gains
tax must provide marital exemption). Cf 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supranote 10, at 343
(proposing deathtime gains tax with carryover basis for marital bequests); President's1963
Tax Message, supra note 41, at 130-32 (same).
150 For example, H.R. 8 provided a tax-free basis step-up for up to $3,000,000 of property
passing to a surviving spouse in a form eligible for the existing estate tax marital deduction.
See H.R. 8, supranote 1, § 103 (proposed section 1022(b)(2)(C)). Thus, even after the repeal
of the estate tax, the income tax would be haunted by a spectral version of the terminable
interest rule and its various exceptions.
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governed by distinct sets of rules: assets fully subject to the
general regime of deemed realization at death; assets passing
to a surviving spouse in a form qualifying for carryover basis
treatment; and assets eligible for a tax-free basis step-up
pursuant to one or more exemptions. For example, a general
exemption might well be allocated first to non-marital assets
to minimize the amount of gain realized at death and
preserve a pure carryover basis for assets passing to the
surviving spouse.' 5 '
A deathtime gains tax that allows carryover basis for
marital bequests also raises the issue of an executor's ability
to maximize deferral by selecting low-basis assets to fund a
marital bequest. One possible response to such "cherry
picking" is to allow carryover basis treatment only for marital
bequests of specifically identifiable assets,'52 though this
limitation seems rather draconian. Alternatively, the basis of
all the decedent's assets could be subject to mandatory
reallocation at death, 53 though this would involve heavy
burdens of administration and compliance."S An arguably
more workable solution would allow carryover basis
treatment as long as the basis-to-value ratio of assets used to

See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 423-24. The question remains whether, in the event
that the non-marital assets do not absorb the available basis adjustment (i.e., because those
assets have relatively little built-in gain), the remaining adjustment can be allocated to the
marital share. This question cannot be answered simply by reference to the concept of the
married couple as a single taxable unit, see id. at 423-24, but leads instead to the
intractable issue of whether the exemption for a married couple should be equal to or less
than twice the exemption for an unmarried individual. See Gutman, supra note 10, at 121935 (discussing marriage penalties and bonuses in context of transfer taxes). The same issue
concerning the treatment of married couples arises in a carryover basis regime if marital
bequests qualify for a tax-free basis step-up, as provided in H.R. 8.
12 Cf Graetz, supra note 42, at 847 (suggesting similar rule, coupled with gross-up
requirement, for charitable bequests).
I The 1969 Treasury proposals recommended this approach "to eliminate any tax
incentive for the decedent or his executor to transfer any particular piece of property to any
particular person or entity." 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 344-45.
1' See Graetz, supra note 42, at 839-40, 844-45; Zelenak, supra note 51, at 400.
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fund the marital share is no less than that of all assets
available to satisfy the bequest.'55
A more serious issue raised by a carryover basis rule for
marital bequests under a deathtime gains tax involves the
problem of "suspended basis." Prior to full funding of a
pecuniary bequest,'5 6 the executor does not necessarily know
how assets will ultimately be allocated between the surviving
spouse and the other beneficiaries, and it is therefore
impossible to determine the amount of gain on an interim
sale of assets.'5 7 In the absence of a workable solution to the
problem of suspended basis, the most sensible approach may
be simply to abandon the notion of special treatment for
marital bequests under a deathtime gains tax,' though this
may present insuperable political difficulties.
In general, it seems desirable to conform the treatment of
lifetime gifts between spouses as closely as possible to that of
deathtime bequests to a surviving spouse. Thus, under a

1I

Cf Rev. Proc. 64-19,1964-1 C.B. 682 (responding to analogous problem under existing

estate tax by requiring that bequest be funded with assets "fairly representative of
appreciation or depreciation").
1" The problem of suspended basis generally arises only to the extent that the executor
(or another person) has discretion to select assets in funding a pecuniary bequest (i.e., a
bequest defined by reference to a specified amount or value of property, as distinguished
from a specific bequest or a residuary bequest). A pecuniary bequest defined by a formula
intended to minimize the amount of gain realized upon funding could require an
interrelated computation in which the choice of assets depended on the amount of gain and
the amount of gain in turn depended on the choice of assets. See Graetz, supra note 42, at
845 n.43.
"I One possible response is to allow carryover basis treatment only to the extent the
marital bequest is actually funded by the time the decedent's final return is filed and to
treat any interim sale as fully taxable even if the sale proceeds are used to fund the marital
share. See Zelenak, supra note 51, at 398 & n.166. This approach does not appear
promising, however, because the time required to fund a pecuniary marital bequest
routinely exceeds any reasonable deadline for filing the final return, and extending the
deadline would merely perpetuate the underlying problem of suspended basis.
Alternatively, the executor might be permitted to claim "tentative exemptions" based on
reasonable expectations concerning the final distribution. See id. at 399. This "wait and see"
solution, however, would inevitably create an administrative nightmare of amended returns
and refund claims. See id. at 398 (noting similar problem in connection with 1976 carryover
basis legislation).
11 See Graetz, supra note 42, at 844-45.
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deathtime gains tax that provides carryover basis treatment
for marital bequests, the same treatment should apply to
gifts made by one spouse to the other during life. Arguably,
carryover basis for lifetime gifts between spouses is
defensible, even if marital bequests are fully subject to the
deathtime gains tax, on the ground that this allows married
couples in common law states to achieve tax-free estate
splitting similar to that available to couples in community
property states. 159
For the most part, the issues raised by marital bequests
also arise with respect to charitable bequests. For example,
a carryover basis rule for charitable bequests under a
deathtime gains tax raises problems of asset selectivity.'
One important difference, however, arises from the existing
income tax incentives favoring lifetime charitable gifts
relative to charitable bequests. 6 ' Simple repeal of the
transfer taxes (including the transfer tax charitable
deduction) would amplify the preference for lifetime
charitable gifts. Under a deathtime gains tax, assuming that
the existing income tax treatment of lifetime charitable gifts
remains unchanged, the obvious way to reduce this tax
disparity is to provide an exception to the rule of deemed
realization at death coupled with an income tax deduction for
the value of assets passing to charity. 6 2 Under a carryover

11

16

See id. at 845 n.44 (recommending repeal of section 1014(b)(6)).
One possible solution would be to allow the deathtime income tax charitable deduction

only for specific bequests and require that charitable bequests be grossed up by the amount
of the decedent's tax savings. See id. at 847. Cf Zelenak, supranote 51, at 403 ("It is not
apparent, as a matter of policy, why selectivity by [a living donor] should be permitted but
selectivity by the executor should not."). One reason for special concern about asset
selectivity by executors is that the volume of charitable bequests is around 15 times that
of lifetime charitable gifts. See Joulfaian, supra note 12, at 20 & tbl.14 (estimating
aggregate value of lifetime contributions in 1981 as six percent of charitable bequests in
1982).
161 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
16

Cf I.R.C. § 170. If a deduction for the full value of charitable bequests is allowed on

the decedent's final return, it might be appropriate to relax the percentage limits applicable
to lifetime charitable gifts or perhaps to permit free transferability of any unused deduction.
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basis regime, no special exception for assets passing to
charity is necessary; an income tax deduction for charitable
bequests would offer a tax incentive to compensate for the
absence of the estate tax charitable deduction.
C.

Lifetime Gifts

Repeal of the transfer taxes has important implications
for the tax treatment not only of bequests but also of lifetime
gifts. The gift tax has long served as a dual-purpose buttress
to the income and estate taxes; repeal of the gift tax would
remove a significant check on opportunities to shift income
from high-bracket donors to low-bracket donees. 63 Lifetime
gifts raise special policy and administrative concerns because
they offer significant opportunities for tax planning through
the selection of assets and the structure and timing of
transfers. 164 Furthermore, to the extent that lifetime gifts
represent shared consumption within a family unit, there
may be grounds for treating them differently from deathtime

transfers. 165
Under a deathtime gains tax, a central issue is whether
lifetime gifts should generally be treated as realization
events to the donor (giving rise to a fair-market-value basis
in the donee's hands) or whether the non-realization rule of
existing law (with a carryover basis in the donee's hands)
should continue to apply. Most proposals favor a constructive
realization rule, which limits opportunities for indefinite
deferral of gain and income-shifting while minimizing
1'
Of course, income-shifting is subject to other limitations as well, see I.R.C. §§ 671-678
(grantor trust rules), 1(g) ("kiddie tax"), but these provisions are much more narrowly
targeted than the gift tax.

'" See generally George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated
Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977) (discussing tax avoidance techniques
involving lifetime gifts); Bernheim, supranote 80, at 114, 116-20.
18
See AMERICANLAW INSTITUTE, FEDERALESTATEANDGI rTAXATION (1969) (proposing

gift tax exemption for consumption gifts); cf I.R.C. §§ 151(c) (dependent deduction), 2503(e)
(gift tax exclusion for medical and educational payments).
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disparities in the treatment of lifetime and deathtime
transfers.'66 The normal limitations on loss deductions would
apply in the case of lifetime gifts, to prevent taxpayers from
selectively realizing losses while deferring gains.'67
A constructive realization rule for lifetime gifts might
reasonably provide one or more exemptions similar to those
allowed with respect to deathtime transfers. 6 ' In terms of
administrability, a categorical exemption would almost
certainly be necessary for gifts of non-business tangible
personal property of de minimis value.6 9 Such an exemption
would provide only a mild incentive for lifetime gifts, in view
of the limitations on the type and value of property involved.
It is not clear, however, that a general exemption for
cumulative lifetime and deathtime transfers would be
necessary or even useful, in view of the types of property that
donors routinely give away during life. 70 Moreover, a
cumulative exemption would introduce considerable
complexity. 7 ' On the other hand, a general exemption
16

See 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 348-49; President's1963 Tax

Message, supra note 41, at 139-40; Zelenak, supra note 51, at 423-24 (recommending
carryover basis treatment for lifetime gifts covered by general exemption, even though
appreciated assets transferred at death would receive a tax-free basis step-up). Cf
Canadian Income Tax Act § 69(1)(b), (c).
16
See 1969 TREASURYPROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 349; Zelenak, supra note 51, at 436.
1

See supra notes 121-141 and accompanying text.

1

See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text; Zelenak, supra note 51, at 427.

170 See Dodge, supra note 64, at 1856 ("there is no reason to create any unnecessary
exemptions for gifts"). It seems likely that most donors who make gifts of appreciated
property during life would retain sufficient assets at death to absorb most or all of the
available exemption. Furthermore, most routine gifts of non-business tangible personal
property either would have no appreciation or would be eligible for a separate categorical
exemption.
" The problem is accentuated if the general exemption takes the form of a vanishing
minimum basis allowance. Only at death would it be possible to determine whether the
transferor's aggregate basis in all transferred property exceeded the minimum basis
allowance; any excess would require that amounts previously allowed be "recaptured"
through a downward adjustment in the basis of property transferred at death. See Zelenak,
supra note 51, at 418-19. Presumably, if the aggregate basis of property owned at death
were less than the required downward adjustment, the difference would trigger taxable
gain on the decedent's final return.
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applicable to bequests but not to lifetime gifts might
encourage some taxpayers to retain property until death to
avoid wasting the exemption.'72
Issues of timing and valuation account for much of the
complexity in the existing transfer taxes, and these issues
would be no less controversial under a deathtime gains tax.
The definition of property passing from a decedent would be
crucially important both to identify the assets subject to a
gains tax at death and to differentiate transfers made at
death from those completed during life. 7 ' After repeal of the
estate tax, it would be necessary either to retain the concept
of the gross estate solely for purposes of determining gain or
basis under the income tax 7 4 or to draw a new line of
demarcation between deathtime and lifetime transfers.17 The
stakes would be especially high under a deathtime gains tax
that allowed carryover basis treatment for lifetime gifts, since
taxpayers would have a strong incentive to avoid realizing
gains at death by transferring appreciated assets during life.
It would be possible to borrow the timing rules from the
76
existing transfer taxes with all their familiar shortcomings,1
but in the absence of transfer taxes the preferable approach
might be to start afresh and formulate a new, uniform

In

The tax-free basis step-up at death under current law provides a similar incentive in

the case of transfers that are sheltered from the estate tax due to the unified credit or the
marital deduction.
173 Under current law, the concept of the gross estate serves not only to measure the
estate tax base but also to identify property eligible for a deathtime basis step-up. See I.R.C.
§ 1014(b) (defining property acquired from a decedent by reference to inclusion in gross
estate).
174 This is the approach adopted by recent carryover basis proposals. See H.R. 8, supra
note 1, § 103 (proposed section 1022(b)(1)); H.R. 2488, supra note 1.
171 As with the existing estate tax, will substitutes and lifetime transfers would pose
difficult definitional issues concerning the meaning of deemed ownership at death. Cf
I.R.C. §§ 2035-2038 (lifetime transfers), 2039 (survivorship annuities), 2040 (joint and
survivor tenancies), 2041 (general powers of appointment), 2042 (life insurance).
1
For such a proposal, see Zelenak, supra note 51, at 410 (discussing timing rules).
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completion rule.'77 Valuation problems with respect to certain
types of property (e.g., interests in closely held businesses or
trusts and interests subject to special restrictions) would be
just as intractable as under the existing transfer taxes.178
A related but distinct concern under a deathtime gains tax
involves the use of long-term trusts to circumvent periodic
realization at death.'79 This issue is also familiar from the
existing transfer taxes, and it would be possible to borrow the
conceptual apparatus of the generation-skipping transfer tax
to identify the timing and amount of taxable transfers under
a deathtime gains tax.'80 But again, in the absence of transfer
taxes it is not clear that such a complex superstructure would
be desirable.' 8 '
Problems of timing and valuation would be minimized in
a carryover basis regime that provided uniform treatment for
lifetime and deathtime transfers. However, timing and
valuation issues would remain significant to the extent that
either type of transfer qualified for more favorable treatment
than the other. For example, an exemption resulting in a
limited basis step-up may be unavoidable for deathtime
transfers, but there is no need to encourage accelerated

17

For reform proposals aimed at simplifying the existing completion rules, see 1969

TREASURY PROPOSALS, supranote 10, at 351-87; U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Tax Reform for
Fairness,Simplicity, and Economic Growth, in 2 GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TREASURY
DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS 374-83 (1984).
'" For a proposal to borrow the valuation provisions from the existing transfer taxes, see
Zelenak, supra note 51, at 413-14.
'"
Indeed, as several states move to relax or repeal traditional perpetuities restrictions,
the phenomenon of perpetual private trusts is likely to become increasingly widespread and
controversial. See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities:
Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (1987).
180 For such a proposal, see Zelenak, supra note 51, at 411-13. Compare Dodge, supra
note 64, at 1849 (finding no problem with deferral through trusts, but arguing that if
problem is considered significant, deemed realization should occur every 10 or 20 years
rather than at "the death of a beneficiary or the passing of generations of beneficiaries")
with id. at 1850 (proposing different rule in "a nontrust situation where a legal life estate
or term interest is followed by a remainder").
1"8
Cf Canadian Income Tax Act § 104(4) (periodic tax on appreciated assets held in
trust).
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transfers of appreciated property by providing a parallel
exemption for lifetime gifts.
D.

TransitionalRelief

A transition to a deathtime gains tax or a carryover basis
regime raises both technical issues concerning the method of
implementation and distributional issues concerning winners
and losers. In theory, the new regime could fall anywhere on
the spectrum between full retroactivity (i.e., applicable to all
transfers after the enactment date, without regard to when
the transferor acquired the property)" 2 and full prospectivity
(i.e., applicable only to property acquired after the enactment
18 3
date).
Most proposals strike a pragmatic compromise between
retroactivity and prospectivity by allowing a limited tax-free
basis step-up for appreciated assets held on the enactment
date. One potential difficulty with this so-called "fresh start"
approach stems from the need to value assets as of the date
of enactment. In theory, taxpayers could be required to obtain
a one-time appraisal of all assets, but this may prove quite
expensive and burdensome.8 4 Accordingly, some proposals
provide an optional valuation method in which date-of-death
values are discounted back to the enactment date at a
1 Full retroactivity would be least costly in terms of revenue and most efficient in terms
ofminimizing behavioral distortions, but would almost certainly be politically unacceptable.
Administrative difficulties might also arise in requiring proof of basis for certain types of
property acquired before the enactment date. See Graetz, supra note 42, at 854; Zelenak,
supra note 51, at 382-88.
1 Although full prospectivity avoids the political and administrative problems of a
retroactive approach, it is extremely costly in terms of revenue and confers an unwarranted
windfall on holders of accumulated wealth. See Graetz, supra note 42, at 854; Zelenak,
supra note 51, at 382-88.
'14 The appraisal would be irrelevant for assets that were disposed of in a taxable sale or
exchange before death; and even for assets retained until death, the appraisal would
presumably have no binding effect in subsequent valuation proceedings. These concerns
should not be overstated, however. In Canada, the capital gains tax enacted in 1971
provided transitional relief in the form of a national appraisal date which appears to have
facilitated implementation of the new tax. See BIRD & BUCOVETSKY, supranote 112, at 51.
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specified interest rate. 5' The flexibility of an optional
valuation method, however, may be outweighed by the
complexity and uncertainty involved in calculating different
results under multiple alternative methods. In the interest of
simplicity, therefore, it may be desirable to provide "fixed
rules with as few options as possible," 8 ' while recognizing
that the burden of valuation represents a one-time transition
cost of implementing the new regime.
In sum, both a deathtime gains tax and a carryover basis
regime would involve substantial complexity and accordingly
would increase the time, effort,and expense of administering
decedents' estates. Indeed, any realistic proposal would have
to confront many of the same problems that have proved most
intractable under the existing transfer taxes: identifying
property passing from a decedent at death; specifying when
a transfer becomes wholly or partially complete during life or
at death; valuing interests in closely held businesses with
unusual capital structures or custom-tailored restrictions;
defining the types of marital transfers that merit special
treatment; and curbing the use of long-term trusts as tax
avoidance devices. If these issues would prove no less
troublesome under a deathtime gains tax or a carryover basis
regime, it is reasonable to ask whether it ultimately makes
sense to adopt either system as a replacement for the existing
transfer taxes.

I"

See former I.R.C. § 1023(h) (as amended in 1978, providing discount formula for

valuing tangible personal property); H.R. 4694, 96th Cong., § 2(a) (1979) (unenacted bill
proposing discount formula for valuing property other than marketable securities, subject
to 25 percent floor).
'" Graetz, supra note 42, at 856. For example, taxpayers could be given the option to use
the decedent's actual basis instead of actual fair market value as of the enactment date. See
id. at 856-57; cf 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 351 (proposing fresh start
basis equal to higher of decedent's basis or actual date-of-enactment value for purposes of
capital gains; lower-of rule for loss purposes). In the absence of sufficient proof, basis might
be presumed under a default rule to be no less than the value of the asset at the time of
acquisition by the decedent. See Graetz, supra note 42, at 839.
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TOWARD A MORE PERFECT INCOME TAx?

The income tax treatment of unrealized gain raises
related but distinct issues concerning the treatment of the
transferred property in the recipient's hands. Current law
expressly excludes gifts and bequests from the recipient's
gross income.187 The exclusion is often criticized as an
unwarranted departure from an ideal accretion-type income
tax, and numerous commentators have proposed that such
transfers be included in the recipient's income tax base.'88 An
income tax on gifts and bequests has also been described as
an "elegantly simple and economically attractive alternative"
to the existing transfer taxes. 8 9 Both rationales - perfecting
the income tax base and replacing the transfer taxes deserve further scrutiny.
In general, an accretion-type income tax measures taxable
capacity as the sum of a taxpayer's consumption and increase
in wealth during the accounting period.'9 0 Accordingly, a
comprehensive income tax would treat gifts and bequests as
income to the recipient, since such transfers represent
accessions to wealth similar to taxable receipts from other
sources (e.g., earnings, gains and windfalls).19 ' In addition,

See I.R.C. § 102.
See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 125-47 (1938); see also Dodge,
supra note 90, at 1182-95; Maijorie E. Kornhauser, The ConstitutionalMeaning ofIncome
and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 28-38 (1992).
'

"I John K. McNulty, FundamentalAlternatives to Present Transfer Tax Systems, in
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 85, 95 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (McNulty,
FundamentalAlternatives);see alsoJohn K. McNulty,A TransferTaxAlternative:Inclusion
Under the Income Tax, 4 TAX NOTES 24 (1976); Charles 0. Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax,
Not to PraiseIt, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991).
19' See Simons, supra note 188, at 50 (defiming personal income as "the algebraic sum of
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question");
Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921) (defining income as the "money
value of the net accretionto one's economic power between two points of time').
"I' See Simons, supra note 188, at 211; see also 3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
TAXATION 465-69 (1966) (ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT).
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some proponents of a comprehensive income tax argue that
gifts and bequests should be subject to a second level of
income tax in the transferor's hands, on the ground that such
transfers are analogous to acts of consumption by the
transferor.192 In the case of a transfer of cash, the second level
of income tax is achieved simply by denying a deduction to
the transferor, so that the transfer is made from after-tax
wealth. Furthermore, to provide parity of treatment for a
transfer of appreciated property, the transferor should be
taxed on the built-in gain at the time of the transfer.193
Failure to tax the built-in gain would replicate some of the
inequity of the tax-free basis step-up under current law, since
the recipient would presumably take a basis equal to the
amount included in income, i.e., the fair market value of the
transferred property.
Despite its theoretical plausibility, the notion of imposing
two levels of income tax on gifts and bequests would
undoubtedly prove controversial and invite charges of unfair
"double taxation." 94 In this respect, the Canadian experience
is instructive. The Royal Commission on Taxation, in its
influential 1966 report setting forth a comprehensive
program for reform of the Canadian income tax,
recommended taxing the transferor on built-in gains and also
taxing the recipient on the full value of the transferred
property. 195 A capital gains tax was eventually enacted in
1971, but the proposal to tax gifts and bequests as income to

12

Compare Simons, supra note 188, at 49-50 (defining consumption as an exercise of

rights "in destruction of economic goods") with Dodge, supranote 90, at 1186-88 (describing
act of transfer as "voluntary exercise of... economic power" indicating transferor's "ability
to pay"). Cf DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 20-21 (1986) ("tax theorists
are divided on whether money an individual gives away or bequeaths at death should be
regarded as consumed by the giver").
"
"

196

See Simons, supra note 188, at 56-58, 162-68, 211-12; Dodge, supra note 90, at 1189.
See supranote 105 and accompanying text (noting similar objection to transfer taxes).
See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 191, at 465-69.
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the recipient was summarily dropped.'9 6 Significantly, the
introduction of the new capital gains tax coincided with the
repeal of the Canadian federal transfer taxes.'97
Even in a comprehensive income tax, gifts and bequests
may properly be subject to only one level of income tax. The
tax base is closely related to the definition of the basic
taxable unit: Transfers between individuals within the same
taxable unit do not constitute taxable events. 98
' In theory, the
taxable unit may be defined by reference to individuals,
married couples or other groups. For example, the Royal
Commission recommended a family-based system in which
transfers between spouses and between parents and their
dependent children would have no tax consequences; only a
transfer outside the family unit (including property removed
from the unit by a child at the age of majority) would
constitute a taxable event.' 99 Although neither Canada nor
the United States has embraced a full-fledged system of
family-based taxation, 00 such a system would in theory make
all transfers between family members exempt from tax.

'm
197

See Hogg et al., supra note 144, at 152.
See id.; see also John Bossons, Economic Overview of the Tax Reform Legislation, in

1971 CONFERENCE REPORT: REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD TAX
CONFERENCE OF THE CANADIAN TAX FOUNDATION 45, 54 (1972) ("In a very crude sense,
eliminating the tax on estates can be thought of as an offset for the imposition of a tax on
accrued, unrealized gains, deemed to be realized at death. Nevertheless, the offset is very
crude.").
1
See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, A Consumption Tax on Gifts and
Bequests?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 657,675-76 (1998) ("a taxable unit cannot make a gift to itself");
William A. Klein, An Enigma in the FederalIncome Tax: The Meaningof the Word "Gift,'
48 MINN. L. REV. 215, 253 (1963) (noting that if the family is regarded as a unit for tax
purposes, then transfers of assets within the unit have "no tax significance").
"I See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 191, at 466-67 (explaining that proposed
system "would probably exempt from tax a large proportion of all gifts").
' Current law does contain some elements of family-based taxation. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a)
(joint return for married couples), 1(g) ("kiddie" tax), 24(a) (credit for qualifying children
under age 17), 25A (credit for qualifying educational outlays), 151 (c) (dependent deduction).
But cf Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing GratuitousTransfers Under a Consumption Tax, 51 TAX
L. REV. 529, 541 (1996) (characterizing family-based taxation as a "radical departure from
current law").
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More generally, a single level of income tax on gifts and
bequests can be defended on the theory that "there is only one
source of earnings and one case of spending."2 °1 Technically,
a single level of income tax can be structured to fall either on
the recipient or the transferor. The former result can be
achieved by taxing the transfer as income to the recipient
while allowing a deduction to the transferor.2 2 In contrast,
allowing an exclusion to the recipient while denying a
deduction to the transferor (and treating the transfer as a
constructive realization event) produces the latter result. If
transferors are generally assumed to be in higher rate
brackets than recipients, taxing the transferor rather than
the recipient may be justified as a measure to prevent income
shifting. Aside from rate bracket differences, however, the
issue of whether a tax is nominally imposed on the transferor
or the recipient is likely to be of essentially theoretical
interest. 203 To the extent that the tax reduces the amount of
potential transfers, the economic burden of the tax is likely
to fall primarily on recipients.
Setting aside transfer taxes for the moment, current law
may be viewed as a rough sort of single level income tax

201

Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARv L. REV.

1575, 1624 (1979). Cf William D. Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax,
86 HARv. L. REV. 309, 349 (1972) (suggesting that income tax may be understood as "an
indirectly measured tax on personal consumption and accumulation"); William A. Klein,
Timing in PersonalTaxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461.468 n.28 (1977) (noting that gifts and
inheritances may be regarded "not as windfalls to the transferees but rather as allocations
within family units of the power to consume").
2 The deduction would be equal to the transferor's tax-paid basis in the transferred
property (i.e., pre-transfer basis increased by any gain recognized as a result of the
transfer). Thus, in the case of appreciated property, a deduction equal to fair market value
would be allowed only if the transfer were treated as a constructive realization event.
See supra note 15 (discussing incidence assumptions); see also Gale & Slemrod, supra
note 7, at 34 (noting that transferors may respond in a way that keeps constant either the
'net-of-tax inheritance received" or the "gross (pre-tax) bequest"; in a partial equilibrium
setting, the estate tax burden falls on transferors in the former case and on recipients in
the latter case).
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model.2 °4 Because the transferor realizes no gain and receives
no deduction, the transferred property is in effect subject to
income tax in the transferor's hands to the extent of basis,
and the carryover basis provisions preserve any unrealized
gain in the recipient's hands.2"' At the same time, however,
the transferred property which escapes inclusion in the
recipient's income tax base is subject to a separate transfer
tax (nominally imposed on the transferor). Thus, from a
broader perspective, current law may be viewed as
embodying an imperfect approximation of a double level tax
model with one level of income tax and one level of transfer
tax. Furthermore, - leaving aside for the moment significant
differences in rates, exemptions and timing ° - the transfer
taxes may be understood as partially compensating for the
failure to tax the transferred property as income to the
recipient.
Ultimately, the decision whether to tax gifts and bequests
to both parties or only one of them cannot be deduced from
first principles but must be resolved in terms of underlying
policy concerns.20 7 The following table summarizes
alternative forms of a "single level tax" model and a "double
level tax" model. A single level tax model involves one level
of income tax on either the recipient (top row) or the

See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX PoLicY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc
TAXREFORM 33-35 (2d ed. 1984); Bradford, supra note 192, at 29-30. Current law falls short
of a full single level tax, since unrealized appreciation at death escapes income tax
altogether, but a deathtime gains tax would fill this gap.
2
For purposes of determining loss, however, the recipient's basis cannot exceed the fair
market value of the transferred property at the time of the gift. See I.R.C. § 1015(a).

The carryover basis provisions preserve unrealized gain in the recipient's hands but
also allow indefinite deferral through successive gifts (or complete forgiveness if the
recipient retains the property until death). Moreover, the transfer taxes exempt substantial
amounts of property from tax by means of the unified credit.
See Bradford, supra note 192, at 21 ("the preferred policy is to be sought not in
abstract reasoning but in concrete comparisons of the effect on tax burdens and other
characteristics of the tax system"); id. at 30-31 (discussing "bestowal-inclusive" and
"bestowal-exclusive" models).
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transferor (bottom row).2 °8 A double level tax model involves
either an income tax on both parties (top row) or an income
tax on one party coupled with a separate transfer tax (bottom
row):

2 °9

Single Level Tax

Double Level Tax

Income tax on
recipient

Transferor deducts
transfer;
Recipient includes
transfer in income,

Transferor realizes
gain (no deduction);
Recipient includes
transfer in income.

No income tax
on recipient

Transferor realizes
gain (no deduction);
Recipient excludes
transfer from income,

Transferor realizes
gain (no deduction);
Recipient excludes
transfer from income
(but separate
transfer tax imposed
on transferor).

In theory, a single level tax model can be implemented at
the recipient level. This approach would require that the
value of the transferred property be included in the
recipient's income and would allow a matching deduction to
the transferor. Imposing the tax at the recipient level is
objectionable, however, on grounds of policy because it
creates virtually unlimited opportunities for high-bracket
transferors to shift income to low-bracket recipients.2 10
Furthermore, including gifts and bequests in the recipient's
income tax base implies not only that the recipient would

The single level of income tax could also be split between the transferor and the
recipient, as under current law. See supra notes 204 & 205 and accompanying text.
I In a double level tax model, the income tax could be imposed nominally either on the
transferor or on the recipient; similarly, the transfer tax could be recast as a tax on the
recipient (e.g., an inheritance or accessions tax).
210 The problem would be even more severe in the event of a mismatch of character, i.e.,
if the transferor's deduction reduced ordinary income and the recipient reported the receipt
as capital gain.
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receive the transferred property with a fair-market-value
basis (reflecting the amount included in income) but also that
the transferor would realize any built-in gain at the time of
the transfer.2 1 ' The resulting treatment of both parties is
consistent with a constructive taxable exchange of property
(paid by the transferor to the recipient) for services (rendered
by the recipient to the transferor).212 Thus, taxing gifts and
bequests as income to the recipient may be more constraining
than appears at first glance. Although some proponents
hesitate to make the point explicitly, 21 treating gifts and
bequests as income to the recipient appears to be feasible
primarily, and perhaps exclusively, in the context of a full
double level tax model.
A double level tax model raises the issue of whether gifts
and bequests should be taxed both to the transferor and to
the recipient under the income tax or, alternatively, subjected
to one level of income tax coupled with a separate transfer
tax. Assuming that such transfers are subject to at least one
level of income tax, there may be sound reasons to implement
the second level of tax through a separate tax on transfers (or
accessions).2 14 A separate tax on gifts and bequests may serve
211

Allowing the recipient to take a stepped-up basis without requiring the transferor to

realize built-in gain would give rise to the same sort of inequity arising from the tax-free
basis step-up for property acquired from a decedent under current law. Transferors would
have unlimited opportunities to eliminate capital gains tax liability through lifetime gifts.
212 Some economists account for gratuitous transfers in similar terms of a deemed
exchange. See B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON.
1045 (1985); Donald Cox, Motives for PrivateIncome Transfers, 95 J. POL. ECON. 508 (1987);
Maria G. Perozek, A Reexaminationof the Strategic Bequest Motive, 106 J. POL. ECON. 423
(1998).
212 See Dodge, supra note 90, at 1189 & n.57 (noting that proposal to include gifts and
bequests in recipient's income "would not preclude additionally taxing the transferor on
previously unrealized appreciation, resulting in full double taxation on transfers of
appreciated property," but insisting that proposal "is not founded upon a notion of full
double taxation"); cf McNulty, FundamentalAlternatives,supra note 189, at 95 (noting that
.some theorists would even insist on a new deduction for the donor if the donee is to be
taxed on a gift as income; others would vehemently disagree").
21, See Klein, supra note 198, at 255 (noting that "there may be acceptable reasons for
exempting inheritances from the income tax and subjecting them to a separate tax system,"
even though the estate tax may be a "clumsy device" to achieve presumed goals); Burke &

20011

Death Without Taxes?

553

multiple functions which cannot be adequately served by the
income tax, no matter how comprehensive its base. 215 Thus,
the costs of administering a separate tax may be offset by
gains in flexibility - i.e., the availability of a cumulative
lifetime base and a separate structure of progressive rates for
gifts and bequests.2 16 Indeed, a system with several
countervailing taxes may be preferable to a single, uniform
217
tax base in terms of equity, efficiency, and administrability.
Alternative methods of taxing gifts and bequests deserve
serious attention in proposals for a double level tax model. In
the current political climate, however, the prospects for
implementing a full double level tax model in any form
appear remote indeed. There is no reason to believe that a
proposal to tax gifts and bequests as income to the recipient
would be greeted more enthusiastically than a reformed
transfer tax or an accessions tax. Hard-core opponents of the
existing transfer taxes show no interest in improving the
operation of those taxes or replacing them with a more
effective alternative. Their goal is to eliminate all taxes on
wealth transfers, not to change their form.
V.

CONCLUSION

Recent Congressional initiatives to repeal the transfer
taxes highlight the inequitable treatment of unrealized

McCouch, supra note 198, at 699-704 (discussing alternative vehicles for separate tax on
gifts and bequests).
215 For example, the goals of taxing gifts and bequests might include (1) reaching nonpecuniary benefits associated with wealth; (2) curbing accumulation and encouraging
dispersion of wealth; and (3) providing differentiated treatment for inherited and saved
wealth. See INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT
TAXATION: REPORT OF A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY PROFESSOR J.E. MEADE 317-18 (1978)
(MEADE REPORT).
21'

For proposals contemplating differential tax rates for inherited as distinguished from

earned wealth, see MEADE REPORT, supranote 215, at 518; EUGENIO RIGNANO, THE SOCIAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INHERITANCE TAX (William J. Shultz trans., 1924); WILLIAM VICKREY,
AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 224-48 (1947).
211

See Lester C. Thurow, Net Worth Taxes, 25 NAT'L TAXJ. 417, 422 (1972).
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appreciation at death under the existing income tax.
Eliminating the estate tax would create new pressure to
address the anomalous basis step-up for appreciated property
passing from a decedent. In response, Congress could either
impose a deathtime gains tax or adopt a carryover basis
regime. The choice between these two alternatives has
changed fundamentally since 1976, when carryover basis was
enacted as an income tax measure in conjunction with
structural reform of the transfer taxes. Today, the central
goal of transfer tax activists has shifted from reform to
outright repeal; any accompanying change in the income tax
represents no more than a concession to make elimination of
the transfer taxes politically palatable.
Carryover basis may be politically expedient and
reasonably capable of practical implementation. Especially in
the absence of transfer taxes, however, a deathtime gains tax
may be preferable in terms of distributional impact and
revenue-raising capacity as well as effectiveness in curbing
deferral and ameliorating lock-in. Both a deathtime gains tax
and a carryover basis regime would bring added complexity
and administrative difficulties in establishing basis and
defining appropriate exemptions. In addition, many familiar
problems in the transfer taxes - identifying deathtime
transfers and distinguishing them from lifetime gifts,
defining marital transfers qualifying for special treatment,
and valuing assets - would reappear in the income tax
context. While hardly insuperable, these issues should not be
ignored or minimized, even by the most ardent opponents of
transfer taxes.
The renewed assault on the transfer taxes hearkens back
to the tax-cutting fervor of the early 1980s, which led to a
dramatic yet temporary reduction in the progressivity of the
federal tax system. The experience of the last two decades,
however, suggests that such radical tax policy initiatives may
be self-limiting. Replacing the existing transfer taxes with a
deathtime gains tax or a carryover basis regime is fraught
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with difficult technical and policy issues as well as potentially
serious distributional implications. Those who favor
abolishing the transfer taxes should clarify whether their
goal is to reduce the progressivity of the existing tax system
or to trade one tax instrument for a different but equally
progressive one. 218 Instead of focusing narrowly on the
shortcomings of the existing transfer taxes, the debate should
include more careful and thoughtful consideration of the
repercussions of repeal on the larger tax system.

218See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 19.

